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ABSTRACT 
 
The establishment of AFRICOM was met with a wave of criticism from African 
leaders as well as from members within the American government. Despite the 
seemingly lofty declarations by the USA about the purpose of AFRICOM, the 
enthusiasm was not shared by all African leaders.  
 
This study explored the reasons for the establishment of the USA-Africa 
Command, AFRICOM. In doing so, it also examined the reaction of African leaders 
after the announcement of the establishment of AFRICOM. The study further 
looked at the reasons behind the lack of appreciation by African leaders for a 
unilateral decision by the USA to establish a military Command on the African 
continent. This study further investigated whether the USA military footprint in 
Africa increased since the establishment of AFRICOM as well as the security 
implications for Africa since AFRICOM’s establishment.  
 
Thus the study confirmed an earlier assertion that AFRICOM needs to stabilise the 
African continent for USA’s economic onslaught. The initial fears of USA’s 
interference and dominance on the continent is thus far unfounded, as unified 
African opposition to AFRICOM forced the USA to change track regarding some of 
its plans regarding AFRICOM. An initial charge that AFRICOM is another form of 
colonialisation of Africa by the USA cannot be borne out by this research.       
                                                                             
The study showed that significant developments took place in Africa in the last 
decade, changing it from a “hopeless” continent to a continent “rising”. This has 
focused the world’s attention, such as superpowers like USA and China, and 
emerging giants like Russia, Brazil and India, on Africa. This led to a dramatic shift 
in USA foreign policy towards Africa, giving rise to the birth of AFRICOM in 2007.  
 
Keywords: AFRICOM, Militarisation, Foreign Policy and Economic Interest  
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European Command 
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PACOM 
 
Pacific Command 
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United States Government 
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African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 
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GPOI 
 
Global Peace Operations Initiative 
 
TSCTI  
 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Initiative 
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OEF-TS 
 
Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans-Sahara 
 
CJTF-HOA 
 
Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa  
 
SADC 
 
Southern African Development Community 
 
AU 
 
African Union 
 
USA 
 
United States 
 
CIA 
 
Central Intelligence Agency 
 
DRC 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Africa, despite its great potential and natural resources, is still the continent that is least 
developed. Africa, however, has made significant progress in the last few years. From 
what the Economist magazine of 13 May 2000 described as a “hopeless” continent in 
2000, it has become the continent of hope, as the same magazine on 14 December 
2011, described the continent as “Africa Rising” on its cover page. The economic 
performance of Africa since 2000 has been remarkable, even in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. Africa’s growth has averaged five percent over the last decade, 
consistently outperforming global economic trends. Eight of the 10 fastest growing 
global economies are in Africa. Thus, since the dawn of the new millennium, Africa’s 
progress seems to have taken a turn for the better, with many indicators, such as 
economic growth and governance, showing marked improvement. The perception of 
Africa also seems to have changed, since South Africa had presented a successful 
FIFA Soccer World Cup. It had become clear to the eyes of the world which had looked 
at Africa through the lens of the “hopeless” Africa, that this is no longer the case. 
Conflict has been a major drawback in Africa, with wars and civil strife engulfing many 
parts of the continent. This has, for a long time, been the defining picture of the 
continent. Although most of the major conflicts are over, South Sudan, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Boko Haram and Nigeria continue to pose major challenges. Africa 
is no longer the most conflict-ridden continent, with more conflict prevalent in the Middle 
East (Emerald foresight, 06-2010-0038. UN Report). 
 
The demand for Africa’s natural resources has been the major, but not the sole driver of 
the recent robust growth. Other major growth factors include improved governance and 
macro-economic management, rapid urbanisation and increasing domestic demand 
because of a growing middle class, growing investment and trade ties with traditional 
and new partners, expanding regional markets and consistent diversification of 
production and exports, a decline in conflicts, improved institutional and regulatory 
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quality, the emergence of increasingly accountable and democratic governments, the 
strengthening of national and regional institutions, and a fairly young population. These 
factors are transforming Africa into the next frontier for high-end consumer goods and 
creating new business opportunities. 
 
Despite these positive statistics, misconceptions about Africa continue to persist which 
cannot be borne out by evidence. The first of these misconceptions is that the West is 
pouring money into Africa through foreign aid and other private-sector flows. This 
perception does not take into account the huge sums of money that flow illicitly out of 
Africa with the complicity of foreign firms. The annual outflow of illicit finance through 
trade mispricing is close to $60 billion. An illicit outflow through trade mispricing from 
Africa is much more that outflows from other developing countries. The fact is that the 
cumulative total outflows over the period 2002-2009 were equivalent to nearly all the 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) received by Africa during that time. Another 
false perception is that Africa is conflict-ridden and a “high risk” investment destination. 
The general perception of Africa as the most conflict-ridden society is not supported by 
facts. Between 1989 and 2012, Asia experienced more conflicts (366 conflicts) than 
Africa (310 conflicts). Yet by focusing more attention and coverage on conflicts in Africa 
than other regions, the media unwittingly accords a higher risk premium to Africa’s 
conflicts. There has been a constant decline in the number of conflicts due to the 
strengthening of regional institutions and the number of democratic elections on the 
continent (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, June 2014). 
 
These positive facts about Africa have attracted the interest of the world due to the 
great economic potential of Africa. Some even refer to this interest as the “second 
scramble for Africa”. Among those realising Africa’s potential are the USA, the world’s 
largest economy and only super power. The USA’s Africa foreign policy hinges on the 
following strategic objectives: 
 
• Energy security: (West Africa, i.e. Nigeria and more recently South Sudan, 
Uganda Ghana and Angola. It is predicted that the USA is likely to draw 25% of 
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its oil from West Africa by 2015, surpassing the volume imported from the 
Persian Gulf). 
• The fight against terrorism (East Africa. i.e. Horn and Somalia, West Africa and 
the Sahel). 
• Countering Chinese expansion in Africa. 
 
To achieve its objectives, the USA employs the so-called 3D foreign policy strategy by 
blending defence, development and diplomacy as the three key pillars of its Africa 
foreign policy. In doing so, the Obama administration initially adopted a “smart power” 
approach by foregrounding diplomacy and development subsumed alongside a strong 
defence. This approach was different from the previous USA administrations when 
defence was prioritised (particularly in Africa) with diplomacy and development playing 
lesser roles. However, recent indications suggest that defence is still the key, like in 
previous administrations (Manshbach, 2009). 
 
The objective of the USA administration has (under the former president, George Bush) 
and remains (under President Barack Obama) to attract “partners” in securing USA 
interests on the African continent. Thus, on 7 February 2007, President Bush 
announced the establishment of the USA Africa Command, “AFRICOM”, by indicating 
that “Today, I am pleased to announce my decision to create a Department of Defense 
Unified Combatant Command for Africa. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to 
start up US Africa Command by the end of the fiscal year 2008. We will be consulting 
with African leaders to seek their thoughts on how the Africa Command can respond to 
security challenges and opportunities in Africa. We will work closely with African 
partners to determine an appropriate location for the new command in Africa” (Francis, 
2010:3). 
 
The USA was careful to frame its initial discourse on AFRICOM in language that 
suggested that AFRICOM was primarily established in the interest of African states. 
Accordingly, Theresa Whelan, the Bush administration’s Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for African Affairs, claimed that the focus of AFRICOM’s missions would be diplomatic, 
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economic and to provide humanitarian aid, aimed at the prevention of conflict rather 
than military intervention. In an initial working draft of AFRICOM she stated: “US Africa 
Command promotes US National Security objectives by working with African states and 
regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the area of 
responsibility.” US Africa command leads the DoD response to support other United 
States Government (USG) agencies in implementing USG security policies and 
strategies. In concert with other USA government and international partners, USA-Africa 
Command conducts security co-operation activities to assist in building security capacity 
and improved accountable governance. As directed, USA-Africa Command conducts 
military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises (Whelan, 2007:7). 
Likewise, George Bush stated on announcing AFRICOM, that: “This new command will 
strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to 
bolster capabilities of our African partners. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to 
help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of 
development, health, education, democracy and economic growth.” 
 
The USA used diplomatic language, indicative in words like ”cooperation”, 
“humanitarian aid”, “stability”, “development” and “democracy” in a ploy to sell 
AFRICOM to a sceptic African continent. In this context, Volman & Keenan (2010) point 
out that “US policy makers have gone to great lengths to obscure what is their intention 
with AFRICOM. They talk at length about African peace keeping operations, 
humanitarian relief operations and the like, but the people directly appointed to run 
AFRICOM are under no illusion about what their primary mission is” (Volman & Keenan, 
2010:86). 
 
The AFRICOM initiative has initially created unease in Africa and reaction on the 
continent to Bush’s announcement was mixed, ranging from dismay, suspicion and 
scepticism to a more cautious “wait and see” approach by some, to openness and 
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welcoming of the idea by others.1 Liberia initially was the only African country that 
openly declared its willingness to host the AFRICOM headquarters. President Johnson-
Sirleaf, however, subsequently indicated that Liberia would follow the decision the 
leadership of AU took on AFRICOM. This apparent change of stance was driven by the 
reality that Liberia, due to lack of infrastructure, was never going to be a seriously 
considered by USA to host the AFRICOM headquarters.  
 
Francis (2010) states that no single event in the recent decades in Africa has provoked 
so much controversy, unified hostility and opposition as the announcement by the USA 
to establish AFRICOM. This announcement had immediately sparked a debate about 
two key issues: the perception of a lack of consultation, as well as the location of this 
military command in Africa. It is quite noticeable that Bush promised to speak to African 
leaders only subsequent to his announcement to establish AFRICOM. Thus it can be 
assumed that there was no consultation with the African leaders prior the designing and 
establishment of AFRICOM, hence the inevitable hostility across the continent. 
According to Francis (2010), this approach by the USA to establish a unified geographic 
combatant command and only afterwards to try to secure consultation with African 
partners is not different from other traditional USA military and security projects 
developed for Africa (Francis, 2010:4). 
 
The events surrounding the announcement of AFRICOM highlighted the USA’s 
tendency of ignoring engagement with African leaders on issues that profoundly affect 
the continent. The USA has often been accused of using “Big Brother” tactics with 
African countries, which seems to be borne out by the announcement of AFRICOM. The 
reason for the criticism of AFRICOM was the notion that the command was mainly 
concerned with the USA geopolitical interest in Africa, rather than that of development 
of Africa continent as the USA claimed (Francis, 2010:5). 
 
                                            
1
    Dismay, suspicion and skepticism described the reaction of South Africa, Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, and 
Angola. A cautious “wait and see” approach was adopted by some, and openness and welcoming of 
the idea by others (Djibouti, Tanzania, Liberia, Botswana, Ghana and Togo). 
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1.2 BACKGROUND 
The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is one of nine Unified Combatant 
Commands of the United States Armed Forces and it has its headquarters at Kelly 
Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany. It is responsible for the military operations of the USA in 
Africa and has military relations with 53 African nations. The Command’s main objective 
is to promote USA strategic interests by working with African states to help strengthen 
stability and security on the continent through improved security capability and military 
professionalisation. AFRICOM conducts sustained engagement through military-to-
military programmes, military sponsored activities, and other operations aimed at 
promoting a stable and secure Africa in support of the USA foreign policy agenda. 
AFRICOM’s creation can be interpreted as a sign of increasing USA focus on security in 
Africa (Lyman and Harbeson, 2010). 
 
The most critical question that needs addressing is why has Africa become important for 
USA’s foreign policy. Thus, what the USA claimed was its intention by establishing 
AFRICOM, cannot be taken at face value. The USA contended that the purpose of the 
Command was to secure security co-operation and to build partnerships to improve the 
living conditions of people on the continent. Currently there is increasing footprint of 
AFRICOM on the continent, based on the assumption that securing USA interest is 
premised on stability on the continent. Therefore, according to the USA, AFRICOM 
needs to be read within the context of USA-Africa policy as it purports to be essentially 
supporting and strengthening Africa’s security structures to effectively deal with 
conflicts, peace-keeping and humanitarian assistance, which is the foundation for future 
development. 
 
AFRICOM, it appears however, is more about USA’s interest than about African security 
and development. Africa is the fourth largest source of USA oil imports. In an attempt to 
diversify resources from the volatile Middle East, the USA shifted interest towards 
African oil, especially given the proximity of West African oil fields to USA markets (USA 
refineries in the Gulf of Mexico). The other reason behind AFRICOM’s establishment is 
that USA views Africa as a potential breeding ground for terrorists, citing Africa’s 
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ungoverned spaces and unprotected borders as a reason for its concern. Somalia, the 
SAHEL and Sudan are viewed by USA as “safe havens” for terrorists, citing that Al 
Qaeda opened recruiting bases in Somalia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. However, 
taking the US war on terror to the African continent through AFRICOM is bound to have 
negative consequences for the continent.  
 
Additionally, the USA foreign policy objectives in Africa are driven by her national 
security imperatives, especially the fight against terrorism. AFRICOM encapsulates the 
USA foreign policy direction towards Africa, embracing all three legs of USA foreign 
policy approach i.e. diplomacy, development and defence, as indicated earlier. 
AFRICOM is thus seen as coordinating USA’s Africa foreign policy because it provides 
logistical and administrative support for the implementation of USA’s Africa policy. 
AFRICOM, with its inter-agency approach to foreign engagement, is thus a bureaucratic 
reorganisation providing the USA with greater control over the implementation and the 
reach of its foreign policy objectives in Africa. In this regard, USA military operations in 
Africa through AFRICOM could be complementary and supportive of the execution of 
USA foreign policy and diplomatic initiatives in Africa. This has led to the accusation by 
some, and not entirely without merit, that AFRICOM introduced a militarised USA-Africa 
foreign policy. Whether militarised or not, the birth of AFRICOM introduced a significant 
shift in the USA foreign policy towards Africa. In 1998, then President Bill Clinton’s 
National Security Strategy listed Africa last in its inventory of “Integrated Regional 
Approaches” to the USA. The Department of Defense planners maintained that the 
United States had “very little traditional strategic interest in Africa” despite conducting at 
least 20 military operations in Africa during the 1990s. 
 
Similarly, President George W. Bush indicated during his 2000 presidential campaign 
that although Africa might be important, it did not fit into the American national strategic 
interest. One respected analyst noted at the time that the USA relations with Africa at 
the turn of the 21stCentury seemed to mirror those of the 20thCentury, which he 
described as “marginalized at best” (Barkely, 2009:6). This, however, is no longer the 
case. 
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Francis (2010) also supports the notion that the establishment of AFRICOM represents 
a shift in the policy approach of the USA towards Africa. For the past four decades the 
USA relations and responsibilities for Africa were divided among three government 
departments, including the Pentagon/Department of Defense (DOD), the State 
Department and US International Agency for Development (USAID), together with three 
separate military commands, i.e. European Command (EUCOM), Central Command 
(CENTCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM). The creation of AFRICOM indicates a 
single and unified command for the USA foreign and security relations with Africa 
(Francis, 2010:5).  
 
Similarly, Barkely (2009) states that Africa gained strategic importance in the eyes of 
American policy-makers, hence the shift of approach towards Africa. Much of it has to 
do with Africa’s potential as a producer of crude oil. Africa had recently surpassed the 
Middle East as the largest US regional supplier of crude oil. The continent’s largest oil 
exporter, Nigeria, ranks amongst the fifth leading oil suppliers to America. Angola and 
Algeria are African oil exporters, rank sixth and seventh respectively. The continent’s oil 
production is expected to rise, with Ghana’s president announcing after the discovery of 
oil in Ghana, that his country is a “African tiger”. These new discoveries of oil and the 
desire of the USA to wean itself from the Middle East suppliers are reflected in recent 
figures: The US imported 22 percent of its crude oil from Africa in 2006, indicating a rise 
from 15% two years prior. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report projects that this 
may rise to 25 percent by 2015 (Barkely, 2009:7). Barkely thus sees economic issues 
and specifically energy security as the drivers behind the USA policy shift, rather than 
the fight against terror, which Francis (2010) seems to suggest. 
 
The announcement of, and subsequent implementation of AFRICOM, will have far-
reaching implications for the USA foreign policy in Africa. It comes in the wake of a 
sustained period of increased USA military presence on the African continent. However, 
the reason behind the establishment of AFRICOM is not only driven by USA security 
interests and the USA’s “global war on terror.” As noted earlier, the remarkable 
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economic performance of Africa since 2008 in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
was behind a serious of studies initiated by the USA to ensure that it does not miss out 
on the new anticipated growth explosion in Africa. Consequently, the establishment of 
AFRICOM was also driven by the need to secure USA economic and trade interest on 
the continent. It appears that the establishment of AFRICOM also serves, not a military 
function primarily, but as a precursor to the USA economic onslaught on the continent. 
The increase of the USA military footprint is thus to secure a stable continent to protect 
USA future economic ties with Africa (Barkley, 2009). 
 
The change in the USA strategy is in recognition that Africa offers remarkable 
opportunities for not only the extraction of raw materials, but also the diversification of 
economies beyond natural resources. Furthermore, the strategy represents an 
important indication of shifts in her relationship with the African region from an initial 
focus on security interest, towards a more meaningful strategic partnership by removing 
constraints to trade and investment. At the core of this shift are two noticeably different 
realisations of USA’s role on the African continent: While the USA still relies on defence 
or military might to guarantee continued global dominance, the shift in strategy is the 
apparent realisation that inclusive economic growth is important to security and political 
stability. The USA is seeking to cooperate with Africa by creating resources to bolster 
opportunities arising from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
In June 2012, President Obama unveiled his USA strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa 
which aims to build on past initiatives and strengthen future US-Africa partnerships. The 
strategy seeks to achieve the following:  
• strengthen democratic institutions;  
• spur economic growth, trade and investment;  
• advance peace and security and;  
• promote opportunity and development. 
 
This change of USA policy and renewed economic interest towards Africa culminated in 
the African-USA Leadership Summit with the theme “Investing in the Next Generation,” 
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which took place in Washington DC from 4 to 6 August 2014 and included sessions on 
trade, investment and development, peace and security, and governance. The summit 
crowned a series of initiatives by the USA in the last two years to harness Africa’s 
market potential, as a means to reviving its flagging economic fortunes since the 2008 
global economic crisis. 
 
The summit was in recognition that African economies are among the fastest growing in 
the world with remarkable opportunities for not only the extraction of raw materials, but 
also the diversification of economies beyond natural resources. The USA planned the 
summit in such a way not as to engage the continent as a region or a bloc, but to seek 
bilateral engagements with individual countries to optimise trade advantages for itself. 
The USA thus targeted the summit to outline its intentions and enhance its current trade 
partnerships in Africa and to also expose African leaders to the USA business interest 
groups during the summit. Embracing Africa’s market potential is also a means to create 
jobs in the USA with the AGOA programme, which since its inception in 2001 was 
responsible for 100 000 jobs in the USA.  
 
The United States is not the only country which has taken note of the emerging 
economic potential and energy resources of Africa. China has also started to look at 
Africa to cater for its rising oil requirements. China is importing a third of its oil from 
African sources. China has also made a point of courting African leaders by writing off 
over $10 billion of debt of 31 African states since 2000; it has also overtaken the World 
Bank in terms of lending to the continent. As both the United States and China are vying 
for the expanding oil resources of Africa, several analysts predict that Africa is emerging 
as a theatre for strategic competition (Barkely, 2009:7). 
 
 
1.3 CONCLUSION 
In the preceding section the subject was introduced and a brief background was 
presented on the birth of AFRICOM. It also elaborated on the reasons the USA’s  
establishment of AFRICOM and the effort made by the USA to coach its establishment 
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in diplomatic language instead of military jargon. This paper will argue that AFRICOM 
presents a significant shift in USA foreign policy towards Africa. Further, it was 
hypothesised that there were two reasons behind the establishment of AFRICOM. The 
first was USA security and the fight against terrorism. The second was economic 
because the USA was responding to Africa’s abundant resources and future economic 
potential. 
 
The section below provides an outline of the chapters in the study and what is 
envisaged in each chapter. This research report will provide an insightful examination at 
the logic that underlies AFRICOM. This research report is composed of six chapters as 
follows: 
 
1.4  OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
 
This chapter introduces AFRICOM. It also presents the background and the reaction to 
the establishment of AFRICOM. The chapter also provides an outline of the research by 
presenting a chapter outline and also deals with the significance of the research, the 
problem statement and the purpose statement, the research questions, and the 
limitations of the research. The chapter thus not only provides an introduction and 
background of the work to be done, but also an outline and overview of the envisaged 
research project. 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter the literature review will be presented. AFRICOM and USA foreign policy 
towards Africa will be discussed as presented by the literature under review. The 
researcher will also look at the literature on the response to the establishment 
AFRICOM, the USA military expansion in Africa as well as the war on terrorism. The 
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purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding and overview of the literature on 
the subject and the main issues raised by the literature on AFRICOM. 
 
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter deals with the research approach as well as the research design of the 
study. This chapter also discusses the sampling techniques as well as proposing how 
data will be collected and analysed. 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION 
 
This chapter will present the data that was collected from the respondents. The 
respondents are from different entities and have a good knowledge of AFRICOM and 
who have different ideological and political leanings to ensure a spectrum of opinions on 
the subject. The sampled populations will be drawn from individuals working in the 
South African National Defence Force, State Security Agency, International Relations, 
academia, African Relations, Institute for Security Studies and the American Embassy 
and these individuals have access to the latest and reliable information about 
AFRICOM.   
 
CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter will analyse and discuss the data collected and presented in chapter four. 
The text will be summarised by checking the key themes and phrases which were used 
in a more detailed analysis. 
 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS 
 
Conclusions will be drawn from the data collected and the literature discussed. Findings 
will be presented to indicate how the research been able to, or has not been able to, 
answer the research questions raised at the outset of this study. 
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1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The research is necessary as it will provide an important contribution to our knowledge 
on the development, growth and current direction of USA foreign policy on Africa and 
the relations between the two countries. Further, it seeks to make a contribution to the 
academic understanding of the growth of USA-Africa foreign policy and the 
opportunities and challenges these foreign policy positions hold for the continent.  
 
1.6 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
This research seeks to explore the reason behind the establishment of the USA-Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) in 2007. Though the USA sought to convince African leaders it 
was in their interest that the Command was established, the study will critically 
interrogate this claim. The study will also seek to provide answers on the implications of 
the establishment of AFRICOM are for the continent, and what advantages and/or 
disadvantages it may hold for the African continent. 
 
1.7 PURPOSE STATEMENT 
 
The purpose of this research is to establish the reason/s behind the USA’s 
establishment of AFRICOM. The study will help to ascertain whether the reasons given 
by the USA for the establishment of AFRICOM are borne out by its subsequent 
presence on the continent. An evaluation of AFRICOM’s activities on the continent since 
its inception in 2007and an analysis of subsequent USA initiatives on the continent will 
provide answers to these questions.  
 
1.8 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main research question is: 
• What are the reasons for the establishment of AFRICOM? 
 
Fixter C Page 17 
 
This study is guided by the following sub-research questions: 
• What was the African response to AFRICOM and are their initial fears borne out 
since the establishment of AFRICOM? 
• Does AFRICOM threaten the overall security of Africa or does it aid in securing a 
more peaceful continent? 
• Has the USA military footprint increased since the establishment of AFRICOM?  
 
1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
As this study was conducted from open source data, it was restricted in acquiring a 
comprehensive knowledge base due to the sensitivity of the information and the subject 
matter. The availability of interviewees is restricted because the head office of 
AFRICOM is in Germany and the Commander is abroad. The interviewees who are 
going to participate in the interviews may be reluctant to discuss this matter. For this 
reason the researcher will request consent from the targeted interviewees for this 
interview and will indicate that confidentiality will be maintained and the use of the 
interviewees’ names will be restricted in the final submission. There are interviewees 
who are in strategic positions and who would not want to be identified. AFRICOM is a 
sensitive topic and for that reason confidentiality will be observed. In the next chapter 
the literature review of the study will be presented to fully understand the issues behind 
the establishment of AFRICOM. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a review of the literature related to the subject of research and 
focuses on the issues raised by the research questions. This literature review provides 
a groundwork and foundation for the research. The literature review also will help the 
researcher in formulating a conceptual and theoretical framework that will be useful in 
understanding the research topic and later to assist in interpreting the data and results. 
It further presents an argument within the broader USA-Africa relations policy literature 
and also dwells on the need for the research and why this particular research is 
important. 
  
2.2 NATURE OF LITERATURE REVIEWED 
The purpose of literature review is to provide a theoretical perspective on AFRICOM 
and to provide scholarly insight on the reasons for the establishment of AFRICOM. The 
literature reviewed will also provide answers to questions such as whether the 
establishment of AFRICOM presents any advantages or disadvantages for Africa, 
explore the USA’s motives in establishing the Command, delve into the African 
response to the Command, highlight the growth in USA military operations since the 
establishment of the Command and establish whether Africa faces greater security risk 
since the establishment of the Command. Additionally, has the establishment of 
AFRICOM diminished or increased terrorism activities on the continent and has it made 
the continent more susceptible for reprisal attacks? What is of importance is to find out if 
the establishment of AFRICOM has led to greater conflict on the continent, especially in 
areas where the USA has interests? 
 
2.3 AFRICOM AND USA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA 
 
As noted in chapter one, after the end of the Cold War, the USA had a limited strategic 
interest in Africa. These events changed drastically after the bombing of the USA 
embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998. These incidents became a 
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key driver for a strategic USA policy shift towards Africa, especially in East Africa and 
the Horn of Africa. Washington was no longer willing to take for granted the armed 
conflicts in the region, the growth of militant groups and lawlessness in Somalia 
because its immediate interests were threatened. The USA strategic interests in this 
region included securing trade and commerce routes, acquiring natural resources like 
hydrocarbons, and protecting USA nationals and its allies. The realisation of USA 
interests in the region involve the employment of strategies, such as providing security 
assistance, building partnership with regional militaries, working with regional states and 
regional organisations to strengthen regional stability and to establish a military 
presence in Africa. The USA foreign policy in the Horn and East Africa, therefore, 
became primarily shaped by issues such as terrorism, radical extremism, counter 
insurgency and piracy (Manners, 2012). 
 
As stated earlier, as recently as the early 1990s, the USA’s policy-makers gave no 
consideration to the geo-strategic importance of Africa to the USA national interest in 
the 21st Century. The Department of Defense (DoD) stated in its 1995 United States 
Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa that the USA had very little strategic interest in Africa. 
This was not surprising as the USA military operations in Africa were divided among 
three different commands: the European Command (EUCOM), whose area of 
responsibility included Europe, Israel, and most countries on the African continent, 
except Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Somalia and Sudan; the 
Central Command (CENTCOM), which was responsible for the Horn of Africa, Egypt, 
the Middle East and Central Asian countries, and the Pacific Command (PACOM), 
which was responsible for Madagascar and other Indian Ocean islands such as 
Seychelles, Mauritius and Comoros (Volman & Keenan 2010:86). Thus, considering the 
different command structures, it becomes clear that Africa was never a number one 
priority for any of the USA Commands. Each Command viewed its strategic imperative 
as being elsewhere, leaving Africa as a secondary concern (Macfate, 2008:11). 
 
Contrary to Africa’s insignificance to the USA in the immediate post-Cold War era, it 
gained primacy post-9/11 due to terrorism, energy security and the Chinese influence 
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into Africa. The announcement of AFRICOM and the subsequent implementation of 
AFRICOM set off a sequence of events that would have far-reaching implications for the 
USA foreign policy in Africa. It came in the wake of a sustained period of increased USA 
military presence on the African continent, so that the accusation by some, that the 
announcement of AFRICOM capped the militarisation of USA foreign policy towards 
Africa is not without merit. Former USA Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned 
against the risk of creeping militarisation of USA foreign policy and recommended the 
State Department lead USA’s engagement with African countries. He cautioned about 
the perceived militarisation of America’s foreign policy and the ramifications for its 
strategic interests in Africa. He argued that America’s military involvement in Africa, 
despite some strategic gains, had backfired due to the inherent contradiction in the use 
of realist means to achieve liberal ends and recommended that it would be prudent for 
America to de-emphasise hard power and heighten soft power to achieve its interest in 
Africa (NsiaPepra, 2014:51).   
 
As argued in chapter one, the USA identifies diplomacy, defence and development as 
the three pillars of her foreign policy engagement in Africa. Although defence, diplomacy 
and development are presented as equal partners in the USA Africa foreign policy 
strategy, diplomacy and development are subsumed under defence, and its presence in 
AFRICOM (i.e., diplomacy and development), it is argued, is only used to make the 
militarisation of USA’s African foreign policy more palatable. Gates’ pleas appear to 
have fallen on deaf ears with hawks like Rumsfeld eventually winning the day, as seen 
in chapter one, and the Command was established. 
 
Pham (2014) makes the case that the reason for the creation of AFRICOM is the 
recognition that the USA has significant interests in Africa, and for that reason it decided 
to engage the continent. He also contends that these interests are significant enough for 
the USA to establish and sustain a long-term commitment to the continent. Pham (2014) 
further argues that the Bush administration’s decision was in contrast to the previous 
Clinton administration, where Pentagon planners stated in an official paper that the USA 
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should distance itself from the African continent because there was very little strategic 
interest in Africa (Pham, 2014:3, 4). 
 
The question to be asked then, is that why, if just over a decade ago the foreign and 
defence policy establishment within the USA went from a lack of any security interest in 
Africa to such a huge embrace of the continent’s geopolitical importance that the 
creation of a unified combatant Command was not only justified, but imperative?  It 
stands to reason then, that a shift in strategic perspective with respect to the USA 
national interest must have taken place. What caused such a radical shift? (Pham, 
2014:3, 4). 
 
According to the 2010 US National Security Strategy: 
“It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and 
institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our 
world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters, as much as the 
distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of 
democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct 
themselves responsible in the international system. This is the best way to provide 
security for the American people” (The National Security Strategy of the United States, 
2010:37). 
 
The USA’s goal, according to the 2010 National Security Strategy, is to secure a more 
stable and democratic Africa. This, however, does not tell us why the USA shifted its 
policy towards Africa. What, we may ask, is in it for the USA? It cannot be that the USA 
is driven purely by altruistic motives. Carmel Davis confirms the argument presented by 
the 2010 National Security Strategy. He shows that the USA policy in Africa has many 
positive intentions: it intends to extend the frontier of the state to the territorial boundary 
of the country, and to enhance regional and internal security by encouraging democratic 
regimes. According to the 2010 USA National Security Strategy, the “United States 
recognises that its security depends upon partnering with Africans in order to strengthen 
the fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective 
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democracies”. Encouragement of democratic regimes is a key element of USA policy 
(Davis, 2009:131). This, however, still does not provide us for a sufficient motive for the 
USA policy shift. 
 
The USA policy is intended to strengthen the internationally recognised states in Africa 
and to extend the right to the territorial extent of the country. The USA wants to 
encourage the establishment of states in Africa, according to the model of the 
developed world, i.e., states that govern most of the territorial space of their country 
rather than having ungoverned spaces and unstable governments (Davis, 2009:131). 
The United States is contributing greater democracy and stability in Africa to create an 
environment congenial to USA interest. The USA policy shift is thus motivated by self-
interest. Davis supports this view by pointing out that the USA’s intention is not entirely 
altruistic, but is ultimately driven by self-seeking interest. 
 
2.4 AFRICA’S RESPONSE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AFRICOM 
 
The establishment of AFRICOM led to great controversy, not just in the USA, but also in 
Africa (Brown, 2013:7). So vociferous was the reaction to AFRICOM’s announcement in 
2007, that the AU issued a non-binding resolution in which it had asked its member-
states not to host AFRICOM on the continent. A possible articulation of an AU position 
on AFRICOM can be found in the speech of Brigadier General Jean De Martha Jaotody 
(Head of the Operations and Support Unit, AU Peace Support Operations Division) 
during the AFRICOM commemoration ceremony on 17 October 2008, at the Command 
headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Jaotody highlighted the number of key institutions 
(the Peace and Security Council and its components, i.e., the African Standby Force, 
the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, as well as the Common 
African Defence and Security Policy) that have been developed as part of the overall 
continental security architecture in order to re-establish peace, security and stability, but 
acknowledged the challenges with regard to capabilities and resources. The AU’s 
position then was that the AU had begun to put in place security architecture for the 
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AFRICAN continent, and thus AFRICOMs establishment for this purpose by the USA 
was unsolicited (Brown, 2013:56). 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC), one of Africa’s most important 
regional economic communities, declared that not one of its 14 member states would 
host USA forces. Nigeria, a powerhouse in West Africa, endeavoured to block the 
establishment of AFRICOM’s headquarters in the Gulf of Guinea (Brown,2013:56).The 
above responses were based on the assumption by African leaders that the 
establishment of AFRICOM would necessarily lead to USA troop roll-out and the 
establishment of an AFRICOM headquarters on the continent. 
 
Many African leaders expressed the concern that AFRICOM’s founding reflected a 
growing militarisation of USA-Africa relations and pointed to the USA response to the 
9/11 terror attack on its own soil, and the subsequent retaliatory wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, they feared that the USA was more interested in fighting terrorism instead of 
assisting in the development of the continent (Stephens and Arimateia de Crua, 2010). 
 
 
They were concerned, and not without merit, that AFRICOM would not deter, but incite 
terror attacks on the continent and thus make Africa the arena for the USA war on 
terror. Other African leaders feared USA support for repressive, but USA-African 
friendly regimes on the continent. Others accused the USA of a “new imperialism” and 
said AFRICOM was a tool for the USA to exploit Africa’s oil and mineral wealth (Brown, 
2013:56). Many African governments and civil society opinion leaders were also 
vehemently opposed to the creation of AFRICOM because: 
• They felt, and rightly so, that there was not enough consultation prior the 
conceptualisation of AFRICOM. 
• They saw the Command as an accomplishment by a superpower which was not 
interested in listening to African views on their own security, future and territory. 
• They felt the fact that the headquarters was initially proposed to be in Africa, 
showed the lack of the DoD’s understanding of the politics in Africa. Any country 
Fixter C Page 24 
 
which was prepared to host AFRICOM, would be severely criticised for violating 
Africa’s common position on African defence and security, which discouraged 
hosting foreign troops on the African continent.  
• African countries often have a negative view of their own militaries because of past 
misbehaviours, and although the USA military personnel are professional and 
committed to civilian control, some African countries still view the USA military as 
untrustworthy, similar to their own opinion of African militaries.  
• Two powerful states on the continent, South Africa and Nigeria, were particularly 
vociferous in their opposition to the establishment of AFRICOM (Brown, 2013:58). 
 
As noted earlier, most of this opposition to AFRICOM centred on the assumption by 
African leaders that AFRICOM headquarters would be in Africa and that AFRICOM 
would mean USA military roll-out on the continent. These assumptions points to the lack 
of prior consultation and poor communication by the USA regarding AFRICOM. Africa’s 
opposition also stems from a deep-seated mistrust and suspicion of the USA intentions 
in Africa. It is therefore not surprising that when the USA provided assurances on the 
criticism and concerns raised by the African leaders, opposition to AFRICOM subsided.  
 
The establishment of AFRICOM also received much criticism from leading African 
academics, scholars and civil society opinion-makers. Ezekiel Pajinoof, from the Centre 
for Empowerment in Liberia, called AFRICOM “a deadly plan of US military expansion 
on African soil” (Nsia-Pepra, 2014:55, 56). Pajinoof further stated: “AFRICOM will be the 
legacy of Bush’s failed foreign policy that threatens future generations on the 
continents” (Nsia-Pepra, 2014:55, 56). Similarly, IkechukwaEze claimed that 
“apprehension exists about the extent of which AFRICOM may violate the rule of 
sovereignty and its attempt to replace the African Union”. This observation raises 
concern about the threat of AFRICOM to the sovereignty of African states and its 
potential to serve as the USA counter to the AU on the continent. The prospect of USA 
military administered development assistance, and the possibility of USA gaining control 
over African resources at the expense of ordinary Africans, especially in the face of 
China’s increasing expansion presence in Africa, was also raised (Nsia-Pepra, 2014:55, 
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56). The AFRICOM initiative thus initially created much unease in Africa and as a result, 
was met with opposition from the African continent. However, in retrospect, much of 
these concerns were premised on unfounded assumptions by African leaders, based on 
insufficient consultation by the USA. In this regard the USA did well in its subsequent 
campaign to provide assurances on AFRICOM and win over a sceptic African public. 
 
Brown (2013) states that the creation of AFRICOM was criticised in the USA as much 
as it was in Africa. As AFRICOM had an inter-agency function, incorporating defence, 
diplomacy and development, the question was: who will play the lead role? The 
Department of Defense or the Department of State? The Department of Defense won 
the battle as indicated earlier, given its greater resources. Thus, the military was 
criticised for moving out of its lane by taking the lead in doing development work, and 
was criticised for doing it badly. The Department of Defense was accused of being a 
poor inter-agency team-mate, which did not adequately integrate its strategic planning 
with the rest of the USA government (Brown, 2013:30). 
 
When the Bush administration decided in May 2008 that no final decision on the 
location of AFRICOM’s headquarters would be made, and that it would not necessarily 
be headquartered on the continent, many African leaders changed their stance on 
AFRICOM and committed themselves to work with the new Command. It also appears 
that the refusal of the African countries to host AFRICOM and the united stance of 
African leaders in this regard had forced the USA to change plans to relocate AFRICOM 
from Stuttgart, Germany, to Africa (Gilbert, Isike and Uzodike, 2009:266). Thus, 
according to Osman, by October of 2008 the majority of African states had at least 
acquiesced to the idea of AFRICOM (Osman. 2012).The AU also changed its initial 
hostile stance and decided to cooperate with the USA on AFRICOM, viewing it as an 
opportunity for partnership and resource sharing in its quest for establishing sustainable 
peace and security on the continent (Francis, 2010). 
 
Since 2009, AFRICOM leaders began to use a more consistent and comprehensive 
communications strategy with African leaders. The Command’s first head was General 
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Kip Ward, an African-American who had repeatedly stated in public that AFRICOM was 
a “listening and learning” organisation. This marks a definite change of approach by the 
USA. AFRICOM’s second commander, General Carter Ham, also strove to provide a 
consistent positive narrative about AFRICOM. He often repeated the African proverb, “If 
you want to go quickly, go alone … If you want to go far, go together.” General Ham 
made a public statement in February 2012 indicating that: “We, at US Africa Command, 
choose to go far. We choose to go together, with our African partners as well as 
together with our many inter-agency partners, to better meet their security interests and 
to advance the security interest of the United States” (Ham, 2012). AFRICOM was 
therefore not something that the USA did in Africa, but the USA coming alongside Africa 
and going it together with Africa. Generals Ward and Ham did much to win over the 
hearts and minds of Africans leaders and change perceptions on the continent 
regarding AFRICOM. AFRICOM’s various subsequent engagements and activities on 
the continent lessened the fears of most African leaders. This resulted in a cautious 
reception to AFRICOM. The increased USA attention to the continent is now viewed as 
potentially bringing increased benefits like additional resources, training and assistance 
(Ploch, 2011). It is also evident that those countries that cooperated with the USA and 
learned to managed AFRICOM best, gained the most from its engagement with the 
Command. 
 
President Obama, in a speech made during his first official visit to Africa in Ghana on 
2009, also focused on addressing the unease among African leaders about AFRICOM. 
He indicated that “Our African Command is focused not on establishing a foothold in the 
continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of 
America, Africa and the world (Remarks by USA President Obama to Ghana’s 
parliament, July 11,2009 (Brown, 2013:1). At the time of President Obama’s 2009 Africa 
policy speech quoted above, AFRICOM had existed as a combatant Command for 
fewer than two years, and had come under sharp criticism since its inception. In this 
context, Obama felt compelled as the Commander-in-Chief to affirm before an African 
audience his strong support for AFRICOM’s mission of promoting greater security in 
Africa (Brown, 2013:1). His reference to not “establishing a foothold on the continent” 
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indicates that the USA had taken note of concerns expressed by African leaders of a 
USA military presence on the continent. 
 
Francis (2010) believes AFRICOM, as a new single focal point for USA military 
engagement with Africa, will enable greater responsiveness to Africa’s quickly evolving 
continental and regional security architectures and challenges. It presents African 
nations with increasing capacities to synergise efforts in both the governmental and 
non-governmental spheres to address security challenges all over the continent. Yet, 
despite the opportunities AFRICOM presents for the USA-African military cooperation, a 
certain level of skepticism regarding the nature of the command, as well as its purpose 
and intentions, persist in some quarters.    
 
Salih (2010) states that some African civilians, military, security experts and researchers 
have come to realise the utility of AFRICOM’s technical and military capabilities in 
confronting global continental and regional security threats, and that no single country, 
or even region can confront these threats alone. Because African militaries are under-
resourced and therefore more vulnerable than most to threats posed by terrorists, 
international criminal networks, human and drug trafficking and money laundering, 
cooperation with AFRICOM can address the resource and expertise challenges. Thus, 
from this perspective, it is very difficult if not impossible for poor, under-resourced 
countries in Africa to refuse the military capabilities and resources of AFRICOM. Thus 
AFRICOM could be effective in supporting the capacity of countries in, or emerging 
from, conflict. The best scenario would thus be that AFRICOM, together with the AU, 
the African regional and sub-regional commands and standby forces, plan and develop 
joint military programmes to fight global security threats which the African states are 
incapable of confronting alone.  
 
This argument is thus that AFRICOM is a necessary, if not a welcome, addition, given 
the inability of African countries to effectively deal with their own security challenges. 
However, this could lead to over dependency and indebtedness to the USA and provide 
the USA with great political and military leverage on the continent. Thus, while the 
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opponents to AFRICOM had become less vocal, there remains a strong opposition to 
AFRICOM among certain African leaders (Brown, 2013:56). 
 
2.5 USA’S MILITARY EXPANSION IN AFRICA 
 
The USA military expansion in Africa should be seen in the light of the USA’s global war 
on terror, to secure much-needed oil resources and to counter China’s influence in the 
continent. Africa’s relevance in USA national security policy and military affairs gained 
primacy during the Bush administration, hence the establishment of AFRICOM during 
that time. AFRICOM is only one part of the USA government’s engagement in Africa, 
but it occurs at the critical point of military-to-military contact. Its aim is to cooperate with 
African militaries to extend the frontier of protection to include the entire territories of the 
individual countries (Davis, 2009:131). 
 
The shift of Al Qaeda’s activities in the Middle East into Africa in 1998 with the bombing 
of USA embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, followed by an attack on the USA 
embassy in Libya and the killing of a USA ambassador and the terror attack at the 
Kenyan mall, fast-tracked and heightened America’s military engagement with Africa. 
USA’s military involvement in Africa was also accentuated by the 9/11 terror attacks and 
the subsequent emerging hotbeds and safe havens created for terrorism in East and 
West Africa. The USA’s views weak and failed African states as incubators of threats to 
its geo-strategic interests in Africa. Such states are prone to the growth of terrorism and 
international criminal activities such as drugs and money laundering, all of which 
threaten USA interests. The lethality of terrorism attained a new height following the 
9/11 attacks on the USA and the composition of the attackers reinforced the USA 
argument that Al Qaeda enjoyed the hospitality of Sudan, where it is organised to 
launch attacks on USA embassies (Nsia-Pepra, 2014:51). 
 
Volman and Keenan (2010) argue that although AFRICOM was inaugurated in October 
2008, the process of its creation goes back 10 to 12 years earlier and reflects the 
dramatic escalation of the USA military involvement in the African continent. They state 
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that the reason for the growing USA military involvement began in the late 1990s with 
two major perceptions of USA foreign policy makers. One was that the USA was 
becoming increasingly dependent on resources, particularly oil, from the African 
continent. Nigeria and Angola are now the USA’s fifth and sixth largest suppliers of USA 
oil imports. Second, the US assessed that there was a growing involvement of Al Qaeda 
and armed Islamic groups in Africa as evidenced by the bombings of USA embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. These developments preceded the Bush administration 
and started in the second term of the administration of President Clinton into the Bush 
administration and continued under the administration of the current president, Obama. 
This shows that USA military involvement in Africa is not a partisan political issue in the 
USA but represents a bi-partisan consensus that Africa is of growing military importance 
to the USA. Thus it requires a growing level of military involvement on the continent, 
which led to the creation of the AFRICOM (Volman and Keenan, 2010). 
 
Prior to the creation of AFRICOM, USA military activities in Africa were relatively 
minimal and was handled by separate Commands as indicated earlier in this chapter. 
These Commands were mostly conducted through the European Command since the 
USA believed that it could rely on its allies to handle any African threat or crisis with its 
own forces. The USA was pursuing its global rivalry with the Soviet Union, in the Korean 
peninsula as well as in other military projects in Latin America, and felt Africa could 
safely be left in the hands of its allies in Europe, which also has significant interest in 
Africa. This, however, began to change in the late 1990s, as Africa now became of 
direct importance to the USA security policy (Volman and Keenan 2010). 
 
Mesfin (2009) states that according to USA officials, the full-time focus of AFRICOM will 
be to provide military aid and training to African militaries for them to be able to secure 
their borders and regulate their internal environment on a sustained basis. This will also 
serve the purpose of enhancing inter-regional cooperation. AFRICOM will also 
supervise the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, which is responsible for the 
detection and disruptions of terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa and the Pan-Sahel 
Initiative, which was established to improve the counter-terrorism cooperation in North 
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and West Africa. He further states that AFRICOM will conduct security cooperation with 
African states in an effort to support regional organisations as well as to build capacities 
in areas such as crisis response, border and maritime security, especially in the Gulf of 
Guinea and the Horn of Africa. AFRICOM will also play an important role in the training 
of African peacekeepers. He states that the most important role that AFRICOM will be in 
humanitarian assistance, which includes school building and providing medical support 
and disaster relief. A branch within AFRICOM will focus on better planning and 
coordination of sustainable support to all kinds of humanitarian efforts. He further states 
that AFRICOM may even be engaged in the activities of countering the use of child 
soldiers as well as focus on HIV policy development on the continent (Mesfin, 2009:5). 
 
Davis (2009) points out that the expectation of the USA is that of a world that has only 
democratic states, states that effectively govern their territories and which will provide a 
secure congenial environment for USA interests. AFRICOM is the USA mechanism 
which will provide and advance that agenda in Africa. As a military organisation, 
AFRICOM can seek out ways to cooperate with African militaries by training and 
equipping African military forces for them to expand state authority into ungoverned 
areas and in doing so will extend the frontier of the state to the territorial boundaries of 
the country. AFRICOM will do so by providing training and equipment and this will 
extent the states powers and it will bring positive returns to the state. AFRICOM can 
also foster professionalism in the African military forces. This professionalism can lead 
to the encouragement of military subordination to legitimate civilian authority, making 
African states less fearful of coups, and it might also lead to the military’s becoming less 
likely to engage in coups. It can also lead to the reduction of military involvement in 
repression and so encourage governments by positive inducements rather than 
compulsion. Lastly, the presence of other USA government organisations in AFRICOM 
can help integrate USA government efforts because much of the current USA military 
efforts in Africa are funded by the Department of Defense and thus the presence of 
State Department representatives in AFRICOM can lead to increased responsiveness 
of the USA efforts to local conditions (Davis, 2009). However, the possibilities that Davis 
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presents for AFRICOM are far too optimistic and the situation in real life far more 
complex for AFRICOM to be all things to Africa as Davis suggests. 
 
Ploch (2011) indicates that the DoD initially considered locating the Africa Command in 
Africa but it encountered very negative reactions from both the African as well as 
international communities. There were concerns that having the headquarters on 
African soil may lead to a larger USA military footprint on the continent. DoD officials 
then indicated that the location in question would merely be staff headquarters rather 
than troop headquarters. They also accepted a proposal by the Department of State 
that they would rather have smaller locations spread over the continent to lessen the 
USA presence and burden in one country (Ploch, 2011:10). 
 
AFRICOM has military liaison officers at the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia, at 
ECOWAS headquarters in Nigeria, at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping 
Training Centre in Ghana and at the International Peace Support Training Centre in 
Kenya. Those posts may expand and additional liaison offices may be attached to other 
regional organisations. Camp Lemonnier is combined joint task force in Djibouti with 
more than 2 000 USA military and civilian personnel in residence. This facility provides 
support for military operations in Yemen and the Gulf of Aden. The USA military is 
leasing Camp Lemonnier on a five-year lease from the Djiboutian government with the 
option of extending the lease until 2020 (Ploch, 2011:10). 
 
 
 
2.6 WAR ON TERRORISM  
 
The creation of AFRICOM shuld also be seen in the context of the USA war on terror. In 
this regard, Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa, The Sahel, West Africa (Gulf of 
Guinea) and Central Africa and Eastern DRC have been identified at “hotspots” in the 
USA’s fight against terrorism.  
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Insecurity in the Horn of Africa region is indicative of a weak and ill-equipped country 
that cannot detect and prevent conflicts. This is evident of many countries on the 
continent, and as a result, numerous conflicts remain unresolved. This assessment, 
however, does not account for outside forces encouraging or stoking unrest on the 
continent for personal gain. These armed conflicts contribute to security challenges on 
the continent. The ongoing war in South Sudan had led to many refugees fleeing to 
neighbouring countries. This had led to terrorists finding safe haven in countries like 
Somalia where they are provided with weapons to carry out terror attacks (Final Report 
of USA-Africa Relations. Eastern Africa and the Horn Position Paper. July 2014:31). 
 
The August 1998 terror attacks on USA embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the 
September 11 attacks in the USA and the November 2002 Paradise Hotel attacks in 
Mombasa have shaped USA involvement in the war against terrorism in the Horn and 
East Africa. The USA counter-terrorism activities involved targeting Al Qaeda cells as 
these have been used by international terrorists to find safety from arrest and 
extradition. Terrorist cells are also used for raising funds and for transporting people 
and materials for terrorist purposes (Lyman and Harbeson, 2010). Other USA strategies 
of fighting terrorism involve capacity building to military cooperation from regional 
countries, supporting the AMISON in Somalia, USA drone strikes and putting pressure 
on countries which are perceived to be supporting terrorist organisations (Lyman and 
Harbeson, 2010). The downside of these developments is that the USA has 
successfully migrated its war on terror to the African continent. African countries 
subsequently become targets for terror attacks because of their cooperation with the 
USA, as seen in the examples of Kenya and Tanzania mentioned later. 
 
In 1993, 18 USA marines were killed by terrorists in Mogadishu. Five years later the 
same region was targeted again by the bombing of American embassies in Nairobi, 
Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, killing more than 200 people and maiming more than 4 000. 
In November 2002 terrorists bombed a hotel and attempt to shoot down an Israeli airline 
full of tourists as it landed at the Mombasa airport (Final Report of USA-Africa Relations. 
Eastern Africa and the Horn Position Paper. July 2014:12). 
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The fact that Somalia is a collapsed state has let terrorists to operate with impunity 
beyond the rule of law. The USA military operations in Yemen and Afghanistan have led 
to terrorists seeking a safe haven in Somalia. The radicalisation of Muslim youth in 
Eastern Africa as well as the Horn of Africa is a matter of concern to governments in 
that region as well as to the USA. Terrorism and civil wars in the Horn of Africa regions 
are inter-connected and often result in displacement and movement of populations as 
refugees. At different times, Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea have supported the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) against Khartoum, while Khartoum has supported the 
LRA against Uganda, the OLF against Ethiopia and the EIJ against Eritrea. All this 
regional infighting has resulted into a debilitating tit-for-tat in the region, which 
contributes to regional destabilisation (Cliffe, 1999). 
 
Terrorism attained a new global interest following the 9/11 attacks on the USA. USA 
data on global terrorist attacks show that from 1991 to 2007, most terrorists originated 
from weak and failed states such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan and Algeria. An 
analysis of foreign jihadists in Iraq estimated that 25 percent were from Africa, in 
particular from North and the Horn of Africa (Nsia-Pepra, 2014:52). The most imminent 
threat to American interests comes from groups like Al Qaeda, which often targets 
establishments frequented by Americans and other foreign nationals (Cliffe, 1999). 
 
The government of Nigeria is currently battling an underground military and religious 
group known as Boko Haram, which has carried out a series of brutal attacks in the 
north of the country. In the last few years since the military and police assaults on Boko 
Haram, the group claimed responsibility and has been blamed for the kidnapping of 
civilians, the bombing of buildings and churches. During the first week of April 2014, two 
high-profile attacks were carried out, where a bus was bombed in the political capital of 
Abuju killing 70 people and later in the week more than 200 school-girls were kidnapped 
from a boarding school. The Nigerian government immediately blamed Boko Haram for 
the attacks and kidnappings. The USA government, through AFRICOM, assisted the 
Nigerian government in its counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram 
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(AbayomiAzikiwe, 2014:2). AFRICOM has also assisted in the search for the 200 
Nigerian school-girls abducted by Boko Harem. 
 
Djibouti, which is the only host of a permanent base of AFRICOM on the continent, is 
undergoing a $750 million upgrade and there are about 2 000 Pentagon troops 
stationed at Camp Lemonnier in the Horn of Africa (AbayomiAzikiwe, 2014:3). In 
Somalia and off its coast, USA troops supported by the EU, are maintaining a strong AU 
mission and offshore both the USA and EU naval forces have flotillas of warships in the 
Gulf of Aden under the guise of fighting “piracy” (AbayomiAzikiwe, 2014:3).  
 
The challenge for the USA in countering terrorism in Africa is immense because groups 
which engage in terrorist tactics are numerous, complex and not always easy to 
monitor. Thus, according to recommendations made in the Eastern Africa and the Horn 
Position Paper (2014), it is therefore important for the USA to cooperate with local 
governments in the different regions and share intelligence information on activities of 
terror networks and international criminal rings. The Position Paper also recommends 
that it is important that a long-term security governance component of anti-terrorism 
includes the following: 
• Regional countries should share intelligence on terrorist networks. This could be 
achieved in partnership with the USA government because it has a long history of 
fighting terrorism around the globe.  
• The USA government should also ensure reconciliation in South Sudan, Somalia 
and most conflict-ridden areas.  
 
In addition, for the USA to help countries building a rapid response capacity to forestall 
terror and to launch tactical security operations against any terrorist cells, it needs to 
engage in intensive capacity building of security personnel in training, equipment and 
logistical infrastructure support. AFRICOM can be engaged and be useful in this regard. 
(Final Report of USA-Africa Relations. Eastern Africa and the Horn Position Paper. July 
2014:32). 
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Improved USA public diplomacy and African military cooperation with the USA alone will 
not end terrorism in Africa. The USA should also improve its humanitarian diplomacy to 
reach out to communities that may be hiding or harbouring terrorist organisations. 
Poverty and social injustice are some of the main reasons for terrorism in Africa. Poor 
border controls make it very easy for criminal elements to move freely with their tools of 
trade, and Africans are often the victims and have no option but cooperate with terrorist 
groups. Terrorists who are challenged elsewhere are increasingly finding the African 
continent an attractive place to operate (Solomon, 2011:7).These facts should be taken 
into consideration when addressing the issue of terrorism on the continent. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
In the above chapter a literature review on AFRICOM was conducted. The change of 
USA foreign policy was highlighted and showed that the growing significance of Africa 
globally necessitated a USA policy shift regarding Africa. It is in this context that the 
USA established AFRICOM to protect its growing interest in the continent. 
 
The establishment of AFRICOM led to growing discontent on the continent. This 
discontent was the result of the fact that the USA failed to communicate and consult 
with African leaders prior the announcement of the establishment of AFRICOM. The 
USA was also evasive in revealing the true intentions of AFRICOM, which led to much 
suspicion on the continent. As a result, individual countries and regional African 
organisations expressed their concerns and reservations about AFRICOM. In addition, 
there was also a substantial outcry from African intelligentsia, who were concerned that 
AFRICOM marked a militarisation of USA’s African foreign policy. 
 
The USA subsequently did much, particularly through its first commanders of AFRICOM 
Generals Kip Ward and Carter Ham, to lead a charm offensive on the continent and  
convinced the continent that while AFRICOM was their primarily for USA interests as 
was suspected, there were also many benefits for the African continent with regard to 
security cooperation with the USA. The USA provided assurances that AFRICOM did 
Fixter C Page 36 
 
not necessarily mean an additional USA troop roll-out on the continent, which was an 
issue of great concern among African leaders. In addition, the USA also made an about-
turn regarding its plans to head-quarter AFRICOM on the continent.  
 
The chapter then dealt with the USA military footprint on the continent in the context of 
the establishment of AFRICOM and further considered AFRICOM in the context of 
fighting the war on terror on the continent. This, it was indicated, had positive and 
negative consequences. Positive, in that a poorly-resourced African country cannot deal 
with its security challenges and protect and secure its territories. In this regard, 
cooperation with the better-resourced AFRICOM can led to mutual benefits, as seen in 
Nigeria in their fight against Boko Haram. Negative, in that cooperation with the USA 
could make the African country a target of terrorist reprisal attacks as was seen in 
Kenya. In addition, because of AFRICOM, Africa now has become the arena of the fight 
against terror. 
 
In the next chapter, the research methodology used in the study will be discussed. The 
chapter will discuss the research method and the design of the study to be undertaken 
to provide acceptable answers to the research questions, i.e. how the research was 
conducted, the research method used, the appropriateness of such research methods 
used and a plan on how data was collected, the instruments as well as the procedure 
used to produce valid and reliable result (analysis strategies). This includes 
administering questionnaires for data collection and interviews. It will also provide 
information about the participants and how they were selected. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research design and method used in this 
study. The chapter also indicates the target population, the sample and sampling 
method used, data collection and data analysis, validity and reliability considerations are 
explained.  
 
Researchers can find reports of research studies in several formats: government 
documents, policy reports, books, scholarly journal articles, dissertations (Neuman, 
1997). The researcher will use the above mentioned methods to gather information. 
 
The study uses the qualitative approach. It will seek to understand the research problem 
from the perspective of the interviewed officials as well as literature reviewed.  
 
3.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
The researcher has chosen the qualitative approach to study the perceived effects of 
AFRICOM on the continent. The aim of the researcher was to build a detailed 
description of the social reality by building inductive logic (Strydom and Delport, 
2005:75). This research approach also provides an advantage in that the qualitative 
research follows a non-linear research path, given the research topic there would be 
flexibility as the research process unfolds (Neuman, 1997:152). 
 
Malterud (2001) defines qualitative research as a naturalistic inquiry, which is developed 
in the social and human sciences, and refers to theories on interpretation and human 
experiences. This includes strategies for systematic collection, organisation and 
interpretation of textual material which was obtained by talking to people. The aim of 
this research is to investigate the meaning of social phenomena as experienced by the 
people (Malterud, 2001:398). 
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The qualitative research method was used in this study to gather information. 
Qualitative research is defined by Leedy and Omrod (2001) as being concerned with 
developing social phenomena. Qualitative research helps us understand the world we 
live in and why things are the way they are. This, inter alia, included observations made 
by the researcher, semi-structured interviews by the researcher, data collected by the 
researcher and scientific analysis and interpretations of the information collected. 
 
3.3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
According to Neuman (1997), qualitative research methods use non-linear logic paths, 
which means that no fixed steps are being taken during the research process. This 
means that new data can be collected along the way and integrated into the study. The 
qualitative research approach was suited for this study because the researcher is the 
primary instrument for data collection and  analysis, and the researcher often makes 
knowledge claims based on constructive perspectives used to understand the 
phenomenon about which little is yet known (Merriam, 2001). This research approach 
was a process of inquiring based on understanding the distinct methodological traditions 
that explore a social problem. It involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the 
subject matter for which the researcher builds a complex picture, analyses words, 
detailed views of informants and conducts the study in a natural setting (Cresswell, 
2003:76). 
 
“Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning that people have 
constructed that is how people make sense of their world and the experiences they 
have in the world” (Merriam, 2001:13). Qualitative research is a situated activity that 
locates the observers in this world (Richie and Lewis, 2003:34). This type of research 
consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible, turning 
the world into a series of representations, including interviews, conversations, 
recordings, photographs as well as memos to the self (Brayman, 2012:386).Therefore, 
qualitative research attempts to make sense of phenomena in terms of the meaning that 
people bring to them (Denzin, 1970).  
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3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This study had used both primary as well as secondary sources of data. The researcher 
used the semi-structured one-on-one interview. This enabled the researcher to 
“determine the individual’s perception, opinions, and facts and forecast (Strydom and 
Delport, 2005:293).There were seven interviewees from NGOs, academia and 
government departments. The interviewees were given the option to reveal their names 
but the majority preferred to use pseudonyms. Participation was voluntary and the 
interviewees were told that they could withdraw at any stage. The government 
departments which were selected to participate in this discussion included the 
Department of International Relations, the South African National Defence Force and 
the State Security Agency. The researcher relied on senior staff working on the 
American desks as well as the African desks where AFRICOM is operational. 
 
Secondary data will be sourced from documents and books as well as journals. 
 
3.5 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
3.5.1 Sampling 
The sampling method in this study was non-probability purposive and snowball 
sampling. In this study, specific interviewees were targeted to ensure that a rich 
collection of data could be obtained. Seven people were interviewed. This would be 
sufficient to obtain data and it would lead to a snowball effect which could lead to 
important “hard to reach individuals” (Strydom and Delport, 2005:327, 330). By using 
purposeful sampling the researcher can learn a great deal about issues which are of 
utmost importance for the purpose of the study (Patton, 1990:431). Purposive sampling 
aimed to select possible research participants because they possess certain 
characteristics, roles, ideas, experience and opinions that may be relevant to the 
research (Gibson and Brown, 2009).  
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3.5.2 Primary and Secondary Data Collection: Interviews 
In-depth interviews were conducted with participants. The interviews were semi-
structured because the process allowed the researcher to conduct follow-up questions 
during the interview. This allowed for a fairly open discussion framework which could 
allow the researcher to probe for more details. Secondary sources of data were 
obtained from books and websites. Data collection was obtained from the Department 
of International Relations, the South African National Defence Force State Security 
Agency, and Institute for Security Studies, African Relations and American Embassy 
personnel. The research will rely on senior staff working on the American desks as well 
as the African desks in countries where AFRICOM is already operational. 
 
The interviews followed these steps: 
• Participants were chosen on the basis that they had knowledge of AFRICOM. 
• The people interviewed have all obtained a Master’s degree and higher. Two 
have doctoral degrees and a one is a professor. 
• All the participants are male and all are over 45 years of age. 
• One person is a professor at the University of Witwatersrand. He has vast 
knowledge of Africa and American policies. 
• Two people from the State Security Agency where interviewed: one has a 
doctoral degree and one is studying towards his doctoral degree.  
• One person is from the British Army, who is working as an adviser on African 
studies. 
• Two people from the Department of International Relations were interviewed: one 
is working on the African desk and one is working on the American desk. 
• One person from the South African National Defence Force was interviewed. 
• One person from the Africa Institute. 
• One person from Institute for Security Studies. 
 
The following were the research questions posed to the participants. 
a) What are the reasons for the establishment of AFRICOM? 
b) What was the African response to AFRICOM? 
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c) Has the USA military footprint in Africa increased since the establishment of 
AFRICOM? 
d) Does the AFRICOM threaten the overall security of Africa or does it aid in 
securing a more peaceful continent 
 
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
Qualitative data analysis is defined as “working with data, breaking it into workable 
units, it is searching for patterns and meaning in the data and discovering what is 
important and making sense out of the data (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982:145). This stage 
of data analysis is the stage where the qualitative data is turned into results (Patton, 
1990:432) and (De Vos, 2005:333). Data analysis is a technique where reports are 
collected and worked into findings and concepts which are not known (Connel, 2001). 
The primary reason for research is to produce data which will help in the search for 
answers. Collected data will be organised and classified into categories or themes so 
that it can be coded into identify emerging critical themes, broad patterns, linkages and 
relationships that characterise the cases more broadly than single pieces of information 
(Brayman, 2012: 312). 
 
The reason for coding is to describe, to acquire understanding of a phenomenon of 
interest, to obtain a general sense of the information, to identify patterns and to make 
sense of all this data (Silverman, 2004). The researcher coded the data to give meaning 
to specific parts or categories of the data to make the dataset manageable. During the 
collection period the data was also analysed by selecting the data which was relevant to 
the research question. Data analysis and data collection were therefore done 
simultaneously. The researcher did not wait until all the data was collected as this 
“would have cost to lose the opportunity to gather more reliable, relevant and valid data” 
(Merriam, 2001:14).  
 
3.7  CONCLUSION 
The researcher aimed at exploring the reason for the establishment of AFRICOM from 
individuals who had knowledge of the subject, hence the qualitative nature of the study. 
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The researcher sampled individuals who have a scholarly knowledge as well as 
interacted with people working at AFRICOM to gain in-depth knowledge and a wider 
perception of AFRICOM. Feedback from the respondents was categorised according to 
themes, which led to conclusions and findings. The following chapters will present the 
data collected from the respondents.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will deal with the presentation of the data. Data presentation is a display of 
evidence collected. The findings are presented under the questions posed to the 
respondents in the form of four questions regarding AFRICOM. Data presentation in 
qualitative research simply means that after all the data had been collected, the data 
should then be presented in a systematic manner (chapter 4) and analysed and 
conclusions drawn (chapter 5). This chunk of information will be presented in a 
systematic manner to indicate what the researcher has learnt. This data will be 
presented in categories or themes in response to the questions and in a sufficiently 
descriptive narrative form which will be accompanied by explanations, commentaries 
and sometimes comparisons. Due to the sensitivity of the study, the researcher will use 
pseudonyms to protect the participants. 
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4.2 PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
Respondents’ Profiles 
 
The following are the findings of the interviews conducted with the respondents. 
 
 
4.2.1   Whose interest is served by the establishment of AFRICOM? 
 
4.2.1.1  Respondent A 
Respondent A gave a short analysis of the word AFRICOM by problematising its 
meaning. He considers the name choice “the United States Africa Command” 
problematic because the logical question arises “Who does the USA want to 
command”?  He answers his own question by contending that the USA’s intention is to 
rule Africa under the disguise of providing humanitarian aid while the military intentions 
are not properly explained. The USA, he argues, in announcing AFRICOM, successfully 
disguised its true intentions. The respondent is convinced that the USA initiated and 
established AFRICOM to serve its own interest, first and foremost. The US is not here 
to help Africa primarily as it seems to suggest but wishes to ensure that Africa is 
peaceful and stable to have unhindered access to Africa’s rich resources. Through 
AFRICOM, the USA intends creating an environment in Africa that would be conducive 
to serving USA interest. Through AFRICOM, the USA wishes to influence policy-
making, policy decisions and even politics on the continent. The US will, therefore, not 
listen to the host country on how to act or what to do. It will want to prescribe and dictate 
Respondent  A B C D E F G 
Age 45 56 46 50 55 42 43 
Gender Male Male Male Male Male Male Male 
Marital 
Status 
Married Married Married Married Married Married Married 
Level of 
Education 
Degree Masters Masters Masters Phd Masters Masters 
Occupation Manager Manager Manager Manager Manager Manager Manager 
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to its so-called African partners. Although the US may start by saying it is in partnership 
with Africa, but, because of the US’ stature and position as the only global super power, 
it will inevitably dictate terms, at the expense of the weak and dependent African states. 
 
According to the respondent, AFRICOM was established to ensure and protect USA 
economic interest on the continent given that there are more than 7 000 USA 
companies doing business in Africa. There are two major oil producing countries in 
Africa, Nigeria and Angola, as well as Uganda and Ghana which have just recently 
discovered oil. The USA intended to ensure that those countries and their oil resources 
are secure, since it (USA) is the world’s largest consumer of crude oil and does not wish 
to be dependent on the volatile Middle East for its energy needs. In establishing 
AFRICOM, it wishes to have a footprint on the continent and in so doing counter 
Chinese advance and influence on the continent. AFRICOM is thus, what some have 
called, part of the new scramble for Africa, according to the respondent.  
 
Many weak and poor African states, which are unable to defend their territories, are 
happy for military assistance and aid supplied by the USA, through AFRICOM. 
However, those are vulnerable states and also open themselves up to be controlled by 
the USA. The fact that the USA government did not consult with the African 
counterparts prior the establishment of AFRICOM is an indication of the USA’s 
disregard and disrespect for the African continent and its leaders. As long as Western 
countries think of African leaders as not being in the same league as the West, the 
relationships between Africa and the USA will be unequal and skewed.  
 
Summary 
Respondent A is very negative and suspicious of USA involvement on the continent 
through AFRICOM. He considers the establishment of AFRICOM as part of a second 
scramble for Africa as the USA, through AFRICOM, also wishes to curb Chinese 
expansion and influence on the continent. The USA, because of it power, will run rough-
shod over weak and poor African states to secure its interest. He is adamant that 
AFRICOM serves USA interest primarily and does not see any benefit for Africa, which 
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will not be able to resist the overtures of a resource rich USA. Africa will ultimately have 
to pay a price for accepting USA help as the partnership is unequal, with the USA 
holding all the aces, as it were. AFRICOM thus provides USA with a vehicle to 
ultimately exploit Africa. 
 
4.2.1.2  Respondent B 
Respondent B argues that AFRICOM should be looked at from the context of USA’s 
foreign policy on Africa. AFRICOM was separated from EUCOM and it covers all of 
Africa except Egypt, which is still part of CENTCOM. The USA foreign policy is 
dedicated, first and foremost, to USA interests, USA defence and homeland security.  
Although AFRICOM now tries to build relationships with African militaries and African 
states, at the heart of it is its commitment to American interests and American security. 
The USA does not see these goals as selfish, but it envisages an Africa that works for 
the long-term USA interest. However, the respondent argues that the USA 
understanding of how Africa works and what is good for Africa may differ from what 
many Africans believe, as the USA approach involves free market policies, new 
liberalism and free trade associated with globalisation, which in itself is very unequal 
and ultimately detrimental to Africa. 
 
Respondent B considers counter-terrorism the priority of AFRICOM, especially in the 
Sahel, Somalia and the Horn of Africa. AFRICOM does also have air and naval 
capacities that operates out of Naples in Italy. The USA is collaborating with some 
African navies to help protect their oceanic resources against predators. The US is also 
concerned about piracy in Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea. USA enterprises have 
substantial assets and interests in Africa, especially in the Angolan oil industry, and they 
have many other trading interests, which would feed into American concerns.  
 
Summary 
Responded B is less critical and sceptical about USA’s AFRICOM initiative and whose 
interest it serves. He places AFRICOM in the context of the broader USA foreign policy, 
and in this regard, it is quite normal for any country to prioritise its interest. He argues 
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that there is therefore nothing suspicious about the USA’s AFRICOM agenda and the 
fact that this agenda is serving the USA interest primarily. He considers the key focus of 
the establishment of AFRICOM as counter-terrorism and does not see AFRICOM as 
geared to securing economic benefits, as does Respondent A. He analyses AFRICOM 
from a purely military perspective and AFRICOM thus primarily serves a security 
function with regard to counterterrorism. 
 
4.2.1.3  Respondent C 
Respondent C states that the only interest which is served by AFRICOM is the USA 
National Security interest, which is part of its foreign policy. To make Africa safe is a 
priority to ensure the safety of its assets on African soil. The USA desired a base in 
Africa but it was rejected by most of the African leaders because of the American history 
of bullying tactics. According to Respondent C, African leaders realised that the USA 
wished to use the continent as a base to fight terrorism, and it was against turning Africa 
into another Iraq or Afghanistan or Syria. Consequently, Respondent C asserts, the 
USA then adopted a softer approach, disguising the Command as a vehicle for 
development to help stabilise Africa. This had humanised the Command and some 
African leaders had started to see a benefit in AFRICOM.  
 
Summary 
Respondent C also sees the establishment as serving the broader USA foreign policy 
interest, as does Respondent B. While he also sees a focus on USA security interest, 
he links this security interest to economic goals, such as securing USA interest and 
assets on African soil. He points out that some African leaders feel that some benefit 
may accrue to the continent through AFRICOM after the USA has softened its view on 
AFRICOM by focusing on the development benefits the Command could bring. 
 
4.2.1.4  Respondent D 
Respondent D states that the USA’s interests are served by AFRICOM. AFRICOM 
serves USA security interest because it is a continuation of USA foreign policy. He also 
indicated that the USA military wanted to communicate with African leaders only after 
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the decision was taken to form a Command on the African continent. Although 
AFRICOM serves the USA’s policy of defence, development and diplomacy, the 
programme is run and controlled by the Department of Defense, which will determine 
the agenda. The USA sometimes uses development in Africa as a guise to serve the 
USA interest.  
 
Summary 
Respondent D also believes that AFRICOM serves USA interest as an extension of its 
foreign policy. He points to the problem of development and diplomatic initiatives now 
falls under the leadership of the USA military, which in itself is problematic. He sees little 
benefit for Africa and points to the lack of consultation by the USA with African leaders 
prior to the announcement of AFRICOM. 
 
4.2.1.5  Respondent E 
Respondent E states that the reason for the establishment of AFRICOM was in the 
USA’s own interest. He was, however, pleased with the establishment from a 
management point of view because now there was one umbrella body who will deal with 
African military issues. He said there used to be a number of USA military 
establishments in Africa and this sometimes overlapped. Having one body to manage 
the military issues of all of Africa will just make it easier for consultation and 
management. 
 
He said the main reason for the establishment of AFRICOM was the war on terror. The 
respondent pointed to the USA argument of the many ungoverned spaces in Africa 
which was exploited by terror groups such as al Qaeda. The proximity of Africa to 
Europe meant that the conflict could easily spread to Europe. A stable Africa was very 
important for all the European countries because it would address the problem of 
economic and other refugees who were flocking to Spain, Italy and other European 
countries. Thus a stable Africa was critical not just for the USA but also for Europe. 
According to respondent E it was preferable to stop the spread of terror at its inception 
before it spread to one’s country.  
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Respondent E believes African resources and oil reserves make the continent very 
attractive for the USA.  The wars in the Middle East threatened the USA crude oil supply 
and Africa offers a more attractive alternative. In order to secure the USA oil needs, it 
has no other choice but to secure Africa because this is the continent where they could 
secure part of their oil needs for the next 100 years. The respondent argues that a 
stable Africa will mean the interest of America is secure. In addition, he contends, a 
stable Africa means the world is secure. Africa is part of the global world and if this 
continent is unstable and war is planned from Africa, the continent could become a 
second Iraq or Afghanistan. This is something America can’t afford.  
 
The establishment of AFRICOM does not mean colonising Africa. If the USA wanted to 
colonise Africa it could have done it a long time ago. He points to the fact that the USA 
has many of their commands all over the world and it did not colonise those countries. 
The relationships are just more cordial so he does not think the American government is 
interested in colonising Africa. 
 
Summary 
Respondent E believes, as do most respondents, that AFRICOM serves USA interest. 
He does see a benefit for Africa by arguing that that a unified Command such as 
AFRICOM, serves to better manage and address security needs on the continent.  
AFRICOM serves USA security needs as Africa, with its porous borders and 
ungoverned spaces, has become an incubator for terrorism, which leads to hardship 
and instability on the continent. This has directly fed into the stream of African refugees 
to Europe. By ensuring Africa through AFRICOM, Respondent E argues, both the 
interest of USA and Europe is served. He also points to the economic benefits Africa 
holds for USA, with its resource riches and crude oil deposits in countries like Angola, 
Nigeria, Uganda and Ghana. The respondent also believes that AFRICOM as a new 
form of USA colonial rule is exaggerated. 
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4.2.1.6  Respondent  F 
Respondent F states that he believes AFRICOM was established for the USA’s selfish 
interest. The USA foreign policy looks after the interest of the USA which has many 
interests in Africa. Africa is a continent with many natural resources in the form of 
minerals and crude oil. The USA foreign policy is supporting what is important for the 
USA and to have their Command posts on the continent will ensure that American 
interests are protected. The USA may pretend that it is here to develop African states 
but the question “what do they want in return” should be asked. He further contends that 
the USA bulldozed Africa into accepting the establishment of AFRICOM without 
consulting African leaders. The USA did not anticipate any opposition from African 
leaders. Criticism made the USA government back-track on the location of the 
headquarters of AFRICOM, after more consultations with the African leadership.  
 
The USA’s new approach is supposed to include development and diplomacy, but 
respondent E believes it is in Africa only to increase its military footprint and to gather 
more intelligence on the African militaries. Additionally, it wishes to ensure that 
countries like China do not benefit alone from the resources on the continent. He 
indicates that the USA created wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which led to the ruin of 
these countries. Terrorist extremists now seek revenge and reprisal attacks on the USA. 
Africa has many porous borders which makes it easy for any terror group to establish 
itself on the continent. Thus the US established a Command on the continent to fight the 
terrorist on “home” base to prevent terrorists from entering the USA or attacking USA 
businesses on the continent.  
 
 
Summary 
Respondent F shares respondent A’s suspicion of USA’s intentions with AFRICOM. The 
USA’s goal is primarily security but with the distinct goal of acquiring access to Africa’s 
rich resources. He also points to the devastating consequences of the USA military 
presence in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan and fears the same can happen with 
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Respondent G 
Respondent G believes that AFRICOM was established for the betterment of Africa and 
not primarily in the USA interest. He believes AFRICOM is here to ensure that Africa is 
stable for all Africans and a stable Africa means a stable world. He indicates that 
AFRICOM is not interested in colonising Africa or any other continent. He says the USA 
is basically the only country which is really concerned about Africa and its people. He 
says AFRICOM is helping African militaries build their capacity through military-to-
military interaction and training. He says AFRICOM is also doing humanitarian work.  
 
Summary 
Respondent G is the only respondent who believes that AFRICOM was established 
altruistically by the USA to serve African interests by strengthening African militaries, 
with the purpose of ultimately creating stability in Africa. He thus differs most markedly 
from the opinions expressed by the other respondents with regard to the first question. 
 
4.2.2 What was the African response to AFRICOM? 
 
4.2.2.1  RESPONDENT A 
Respondent A contends that the USA was totally unprepared for the overwhelming 
negative continental response to AFRICOM, in clearly articulating that they did not want 
AFRICOM on the continent. South Africa was at in the forefront in the AU in arguing that 
AFRICOM in Africa will create instability and security uncertainty. The respondent 
believes that although AFRICOM has a number of positives, it has more negatives.  
Africa is home to a large number of Muslims who are more aligned to countries in the 
Middle East. A USA military presence on the continent will anger these African Muslim 
communities. Most countries that host a USA base have been the targets of attack at 
some point. Hosting AFRICOM thus makes the host country the target for terrorist 
attacks. Some of the African countries that cooperated openly with the USA have been 
viewed with suspicion by some African states, particularly among Muslim communities.  
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Summary 
The respondent argues that African states initially opposed AFRICOM, a response for 
which the USA was not prepared. While AFRICOM has some advantages, close and 
open cooperation with the USA on AFRICOM could make the country a target for terror 
attacks. The negative outweighs the positive with regard to AFRICOM and the fact that 
Africa has substantial Muslim communities is also an important consideration with 
regard to AFRICOM. 
 
4.2.2.2  Respondent B 
Respondent B indicates that some African leaders were very welcoming of AFRICOM.  
They saw it as a chance to enhance their military capacities and as a way of acquiring 
funding from the USA. There were some, however, who saw it as a new form of 
American imperialism and expressed concern. He believes this is the result of a mutual 
misunderstanding at play. He argues that the USA could not understand Africa’s 
security challenges from an African point of view, but from a USA point of view, which is 
focused on countering terrorism. This will turn Africa into an operational exercise for the 
USA counter-terrorism activities. Until the USA’s intervention, terrorism was not really a 
principal concern of African states because the terrorist targets were western. The 
respondent argues that, from an African perspective, the biggest threat to African 
security is food security and the sort of marginalisation that sometimes comes from USA 
trade policies. He contends that if the USA wants to improve Africa, it must change its 
trade policies, change its protectionist and dumping policies to allow African farmers to 
make a decent living. He also believes, however, that the anti-AFRICOM stance of the 
African leaders have softened over the years and that there is a lot of interaction and 
cooperation with AFRICOM, especially in the field of training and building networks 
between African and USA militaries.  
 
 
Summary 
Respondent B believes that there was a mixed response to AFRICOM on the continent. 
While some leaders embraced AFRICOM as an opportunity to enhance the security 
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capability through cooperation with the USA, others saw AFRICOM as uncalled for USA 
intervention in Africa which could make Africa the new arena for the USA fight against 
terror. USA cannot claim to protect AFRICA through AFRICOM as African and USA 
security challenges are not the same. Terrorism is not an African security challenge. He 
believes, though, that the opposition to AFRICOM on the continent has subsided. 
 
4.2.2.3  Respondent C 
Respondent C indicates that most African leaders did not welcome the establishment of 
AFRICOM on the continent. They were skeptical about the USA’s true intentions. He 
believes, however, that over time there was a change of stance among African leaders, 
especially after President Obama came to office, and indicated that Obama showed 
more interest in working with African partners through AFRICOM. African leaders, 
therefore, began to see AFRICOM, not as the enemy, but rather as a partner to help 
with the development and stability of Africa. 
 
Summary 
Respondent C argues that after initial skepticism about the USA’s true intentions 
concerning AFRICOM, a warming of AFRICOM leaders towards AFRICOM coincided 
with the ascendancy of Obama to the USA presidency. 
 
 
4.2.2.4  Respondent D 
Respondent D argues that the African response to AFRICOM was always tempered by 
the appreciation of the opportunities of military-to-military cooperation with the USA 
through AFRICOM. African leaders, however, were opposed to the idea of hosting 
AFRICOM’s headquarters on African soil because this would mean that African 
countries will have to fight USA wars on the continent which are not of their own 
creation. The respondent also shows that the AU position was always against hosting 
the AFRICOM headquarters on the continent because it feared that AFRICOM will 
render Africa a target for terrorist groups. African leaders also felt that the USA was 
exaggerating its claim that Africa was a haven for terrorists. A large number of Africa’s 
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population is Muslim and generally the relationship Muslims have with the USA was not 
good.  Having AFRICOM on the continent will make those host countries easy targets 
for violence directed at the USA. The terrorists may not attack the Command itself, but 
after the country which allows AFRICOM to operate from its soil.   
 
Summary 
The respondent draws a distinction between some leaders who welcomed AFRICOM 
because of the possibilities of military cooperation it offered with the greatest military 
power, but also points out those African leaders were united in their opposition to 
hosting the AFRICOM headquarters on the continent. The also raises the issue of the 
African Muslim communities and the challenges it raises. An important point made by 
the respondent is that the USA claims that Africa is a safe haven for terrorists is vastly 
exaggerated. 
 
4.2.2.5  Respondent E 
Respondent E indicates that AFRICOM was not welcomed by most African leaders. In 
fact, he points out that they were extremely angry when the announcement was made. 
However, there were a few leaders who were eager to have AFRICOM in Africa 
because they saw a means of having access to USA funds. The respondent points to 
an issue raised numerous times, that there were very little consultation between USA 
and African leaders about this Command. He also points out that much later, after much 
more consultations with the USA, African leaders changed their stance on AFRICOM 
since they realised that there were some advantages, like military-to-military 
cooperation and training which the USA offered. The African Union’s own envisaged 
standby force at that point also could not get off the ground due to several reasons. In 
this regard, AFRICOM is helpful in assisting the African militaries to train peace-
keepers.  
 
Summary 
The respondent believes that while most AFRICAN leaders opposed AFRICOM initially, 
a few embraced it opportunistically in the hope of benefiting from possible USA funding 
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linked to AFRICOM. The opposition to AFRICOM was due to a lack of consultation from 
the USA. After more consultation, more African leaders accepted AFRICOM due to 
certain benefits attached to cooperation. 
 
4.2.2.6 Respondent F 
Respondent F argues that African leaders took a stand against AFRICOM because they 
considered it as the USA meddling in Africa’s business. The African leadership, 
especially Nigeria and South Africa, made their voices heard against the USA’s 
unilateral establishment of AFRICOM. African leaders also feared that having 
AFRICOM on the continent might lead to Africa becoming a target for terror attacks.  
African leaders felt that the USA government did not consult them enough on the 
reasons for the establishment of AFRICOM.  
 
Summary 
Respondent F argues that African leaders opposed AFRICOM because they saw it as 
USA meddling in the continent, which could lead to greater destabilisation. He also 
points to the lack of consultation by the USA as a major reason behind African 
opposition to AFRICOM. 
 
4.2.2.7  Respondent G 
Respondent G stated that African leaders were not happy with the establishment of 
AFRICOM. He said the African leaders felt the USA wanted to colonise them and that 
was never the intention of the American government. The subject indicated that if the 
USA wanted to colonise any country or continent it surely had the capability to do so.  
 
Summary 
Respondent G shows that African leaders opposed the establishment of AFRICOM but 
is of the opinion that their concerns were unfounded, based on a misunderstanding of 
USA’s intentions. He argues that charges of USA as a colonial power because of 
AFRICOM are far-fetched. 
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4.2.3 Has the USA military footprint in Africa increased since the 
establishment of AFRICOM? 
 
4.2.3.1  Respondent A 
The respondent was of the opinion that it increased because there were USA Navy 
Seals and air force present all over the continent, pretending to be involved in joint 
military operations. He believed the joint military operations by the USA on the continent 
are intelligence gathering exercises. The respondent pointed to former USA President 
Reagan, who once said that the USA did not have friends but interests. Consequently, it 
meant that whether they had arrived to provide training or give humanitarian aid, they 
did so solely to advance USA’s interests. He also feared that there was an abundance 
of natural resources in Africa in areas governed by a number of weak states which 
could be corrupted and all those resources diverted to the USA.  
 
Summary 
The respondent feels that there is a definite increase of USA military footprint since the 
establishment of AFRICOM and joint military operations are smokescreens for USA 
intelligence gathering operations on the continent. The USA’s presence on the continent 
through AFRICOM is, thus, subversive. 
 
 
4.2.3.2  Respondent B 
Respondent B stated that the USA military presence on the continent had increased but 
the Americans were now more interested in humanitarian and development aid to win 
support to convince African leaders of their good intentions. The USA military had put 
Africa on the map and there had been a lot more interest in the African militaries since 
the establishment of AFRICOM. The USA saw Africa as the site from which a terrorist 
threat was emanating. The USA military’s capability to respond to natural disasters like 
the recent floods in Malawi was is welcomed. The USA military played a role in helping 
Africa. AFRICOM was very keen in assisting with fighting organised crime, which is 
often closely linked to terrorism.  
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Summary 
According to the respondent the USA military footprint has indeed increased but it is 
more in line with providing humanitarian aid, which has been helpful in softening the 
stance of African leaders towards AFRICOM. 
 
4.2.3.3  Respondent C 
Respondent C felt the USA military footprint had increased, especially in Djibouti. The 
AFRICOM base in Djibouti has more than 2 000 military personnel. It also has a military 
airstrip. The USA has a military attaché in most African countries. The USA military is 
providing training to the African military personnel in Africa as well as in America. 
 
Summary 
Respondent focused on Djibouti in East Africa, which was in existence before the 
establishment of AFRICOM. 
 
4.2.3.4  Respondent D 
Respondent D stated that AFRICOM was increasing its footprint on the continent. It was 
helping the weaker states through military-to-military co-operations. The US had a large 
base in Djibouti as well as military airspace. It was also expanding USA military 
personnel at embassies in Africa. The USA war on terror targets had moved to Africa 
and the Americans were using intelligence to find them. As a result, their intelligence 
personnel must be increased significantly to sniff out terror targets.  
 
 
Summary 
According to the respondent, there is an increase of USA military personnel, but it 
should be welcomed as it helps weak African states to meet their security challenges. 
However, this means that USA intelligence operations on the continent has also 
increased, which could lead to destabilisation. 
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4.2.3.5  Respondent E 
Respondent E stated that the USA footprint had increased on the continent. There were 
more USA troops at the moment on the continent because they were in Africa 
ostensibly to assist weak African militaries. They were also helping these countries with 
infrastructure projects. The USA was contributing to get the African Union Africa 
standby force on its feet. According to the respondent, the USA is the only country 
which has the budget to really assist the continent. They are also helping with piracy 
operations trying to keep the African waters safe.  
 
Summary 
Respondent E believes that while there is an increased USA military footprint in Africa, 
Africa benefits from this USA presence and the USA is doing much good on the 
continent. 
 
4.2.3.6  Respondent F 
Respondent F believed that the USA military footprint on the continent had increased 
and that it would increase even more in coming years for the simple reason that the 
USA was using its financial muscle to influence and sway African leaders to accept its 
presence on the continent. The respondent believed that the USA military is doing a lot 
of humanitarian work on the continent. He indicated that there was a lot of military-to-
military cooperation between American military and African military personnel. He 
believed that Africans were benefiting from AFRICOM’s presence on the continent. He, 
however, believed that the military still did not only do the good altruistically, but that it 
was doing everything in its power to ensure that it gained the trust of political leaders to 
gain more intelligence on Africa’s militaries and military capabilities. He also believed 
that the USA military was gathering intelligence on African militaries in case of future 
conflict. 
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Summary 
According to Respondent F, the increased USA military footprint, its involvement in 
humanitarian acts and military-to-military cooperation on the continent serves to gain 
the trust of African leaders for the purpose of intelligence gathering. 
 
4.2.3.7  Respondent G 
Respondent G believed that there was an increased USA military footprint on the 
continent but he pointed out that that those USA personnel were in Africa because they 
were on invitation from the host countries. He contended the USA military were doing a 
lot of humanitarian work to develop Africa for its own people. Many USA military 
personnel were involved in helping with countering the Ebola outbreak but these troops 
had subsequently left the continent. The American military was in the process of helping 
to establish peace-keeping forces as requested by the African Union. Military-to-military 
training was taking place between USA and Africa, and even with South African military 
personnel.  
 
Summary 
The respondent argues that USA military expansion on the continent is by invitation of 
individual African countries and the AU and the USA military is doing much good on the 
continent. 
 
4.2.4 Does the establishment of AFRICOM threaten the overall security of 
Africa? 
4.2.4.1  Respondent A 
The respondent pointed out that the mere fact that there was a USA presence in Africa 
was a serious threat because USA installations and AFRICOM personnel would be 
targets of terrorist attacks. He further argued that the USA would use African airspace to 
attack their terrorist targets and use African borders to infiltrate terrorist territories. 
These terrorists, in retaliation, would attack the country from which the USA attacks 
emanated. They would target the host country and this could create another Iraq or 
Afghanistan in Africa. The USA could not guarantee to protect the host country against 
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any attack. While its intelligence was good, it could not save itself from the 9/11 attacks. 
The USA’s ability to offer protection was, therefore, limited. AFRICOM had brought 
peace to Africa but there were still many hotspots in Africa, like in Somalia, where the 
USA had intervened only to leave the country more divided than ever before.  
 
Summary 
The respondent contends that USA’s presence on the continent is an invitation for 
reprisal attacks and the USA cannot guarantee the safety of its African allies, who 
themselves will become targets for terror attacks.  
 
4.2.4.2  Respondent B 
Respondent believed the overall security of Africa would be threatened by AFRICOM 
only in so much as the AFRICOM intervention stimulated rather than resolved conflict. 
An example is Somalia where the USA gave their blessings to the Ethiopians to 
intervene to take on the Islamic courts, only for the country to degenerate in 
lawlessness afterwards due to a lack of coherent leadership and governance. Changing 
the power dynamics in a society inevitably led to resistance and that created instability. 
Another example is the allied intervention in Libya which proved to be a big mistake in 
retrospect as it also created a leadership and governance vacuum. Sometimes 
interventions were not well informed as unintended consequences might occur, which 
could be foreseen as the point of intervention. The respondent pointed out that although 
Gaddafi was a dictator, his removal left a vacuum which was exploited by counter forces 
which contributed to descend the country into chaos. The intervention did not take into 
consideration the regional dynamics, as soldiers and weaponry from Libya found their 
way into neighbouring states with resulting instability as was evident in Mali, Central 
African Republic, Southern Algeria, and Tunisia and even in South Sudan. 
 
The question “Did AFRICOM bring peace to Africa?” depends on whether one equated 
peace and security with stability. The distinction needed to be made because stability 
was not necessarily security because a country might be stable, but be very unequal 
and unfair. An example is apartheid South Africa which was relatively stable initially 
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although it was oppressive and did not meet the aspirations of the majority of its 
population. Stability could also be the result of a brutal police state.  
 
Summary 
According to the respondent, haphazard intervention by AFRICOM in conflict areas can 
lead to unintended consequences of greater destabilisation, locally and regionally. This 
can be detrimental to Africa. Should USA pursue its regime change policies through 
AFRICOM on the continent to remove regimes not friendly to the USA, it can lead to 
disastrous consequences and regional and continental destabilisation. 
 
4.2.4.3  Respondent C 
Respondent C believed that AFRICOM did not present a threat to the whole of Africa, 
but it put the countries that host AFRICOM personnel on their soil in danger as they 
could be seen as being loyal to America and be targeted by terrorist forces. An example 
is Kenya who was bombed by terrorists due to its close relations with the USA. 
AFRICOM was accomplishing much in Africa in the form of humanitarian aid and 
helping with the building of infrastructure. The threat of insecurity may also diminish due 
to sharing of intelligence between the two cooperating militaries.  
 
Summary 
The respondent believes that AFRICOM does not present a general threat to Africa but 
can present a threat to perceived USA allies. Overall AFRICOM has a positive presence 
in Africa. 
 
4.2.3.4  Respondent D 
Respondent D stated that the establishment of AFRICOM on the continent could lead to 
attacks as terrorist target African countries that cooperated with their enemy. On the 
other hand, the Nigerian government was looking at AFRICOM to assist in the fight 
against Boko Haram. The USA was assisting Nigeria with stabilising internal security 
and with drones to gather intelligence on Boko Haram operations. 
 
Fixter C Page 62 
 
Summary 
The respondent believes that USA presence on the continent makes Africa safer, as in 
assisting the Nigerian government in its fight against Boko Haram, but also makes it a 
greater target for reasons already mentioned. 
 
4.2.4.5  Respondent E 
Respondent E stated that no country was safe from terror attacks. He did not see the 
establishment of AFRICOM as a threat to security in Africa. USA is the only country with 
the capability to take on the war on terror. It is the only country that can help African 
countries to root out terrorists and to fight off terror attacks. Since Africa has most of the 
foreign embassies in the continent and because the USA is in most of the countries, it 
stands to reason that terrorists will try to attack those embassies as they are at war with 
the USA. They will attack places where foreigners, especially Westerners, frequent, like 
the mall attack in Kenya. This, however, has nothing to do with the establishment of 
AFRICOM. This is because of the hatred for the West and these attacks are aimed at 
hurting the West. The establishment of AFRICOM does not threaten the safety of Africa. 
 
Summary 
The respondent is adamant that the establishment of AFRICOM does not threaten 
Africa and that Africa needs to cooperate with USA to overcome the scourge of 
terrorism. 
 
4.2.4.6  Respondent F 
Respondent F stated that he did not believe that AFRICOM posed a threat to the 
African continent and its people. He said the continent was becoming a target 
irrespective if one considered the bombings in Kenya as well as all other terror incidents 
on the continent. He believed these incidents had a direct link to the relationship 
between African leaders and the West. He believed that many more attacks would 
occur, especially if the USA military increased its footprint on the continent. Because the 
USA could not be everywhere to monitor all terrorist activities, the African continent 
would be at risk. 
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Summary 
Respondent F does not believe that AFRICOM poses a risk to Africa as Africa is 
becoming a target for terror attacks irrespective of AFRICOM. 
 
4.2.4.7 Respondent G 
Respondent G believed that AFRICOM did not bring or create any instability in Africa.  
He believed that the establishment of AFRICOM did in fact do more good than harm for 
the continent. He also believed AFRICOM had placed Africa’s military issues on the 
world map. He said the military to military relations would ensure that Africa’s military 
was able to deploy much faster should an emergency occurred. 
 
Summary 
Respondent G does not believe that AFRICOM poses a risk to Africa, but has 
contributed in making Africa more safe and secure. 
 
4.3  CONCLUSION 
This chapter narrated the responses of interviewees to the four questions. The 
respondents presented a variety of opinions on the issues and provides for an 
interesting insight into the different nuances of the research into AFRICOM. It is also 
evident that the respondents’ answers are influenced by their particular ideological and 
political persuasions, which makes them either accepting or very suspicious of the USA 
in her relations with the African continent. 
 
The following chapter (chapter 5) will provide a more detailed analysis of these 
responses. However, in concluding this chapter it may be noted that the respondents 
provided valuable insights on AFRICOM: whose interest it serves as well as the reasons 
behind the opposition to AFRICOM by African leaders and their subsequent change of 
heart. It also provides insight on the increase of USA military presence on the continent, 
and surprisingly seems to conclude that the benefits this increase holds for the African 
continent outweigh the disadvantages. Lastly, the respondents argue that AFRICOM’s 
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presence on the continent does not necessarily threaten  security and stability on the 
continent, as AFRICOM does not have a base or headquarters on the continent, but 
multiple small locations in various African countries. USA installations and personnel, 
however, could always be targets of terror attacks which could have implications for the 
country that hosts particular USA personnel and installations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter will present the analysis of the research project in terms of the response 
gathered to the research questions. The interviewee responses to the four questions 
posed will form the basis of the data analysis and interpretation. 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the analysis of the data collected through the interview process. 
Findings are presented under each of the questions posed to the respondents. The aim 
of this research is to establish whether the responses provide us with any new insights 
or additional information about the establishment of AFRICOM, based on the questions 
put to the respondents.  
 
5.2  RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
The findings of this research are analysed as per the responses from the officials 
interviewed. The analysis is grouped according to the questions asked.  
 
5.2.1  Whose interests are served by the establishment of AFRICOM? 
All the respondents except one, believe that the establishment of AFRICOM serves 
USA interest first and foremost. Some locate the establishment of AFRICOM in the 
context of the broader USA foreign policy and argue that any foreign policy is, by its 
nature, self-serving, and therefore it is not problematic that AFRICOM was established 
to serve USA foreign policy interest in Africa. 
 
The respondents also note that AFRICOM serves two main USA interest on the 
continent: First, it serves USA security interest as the USA considers Africa a breeding 
ground and a safe haven for terrorists. Some feel, however that this claim by the USA is 
exaggerated.  AFRICOM therefore primarily has a counter-terrorism function. However, 
by stabilising the continent, AFRICOM also serves a second USA interest in Africa, 
which is economic. USA wants a stable African continent to secure its economic 
interest. Some respondents believe, however, that the USA will exploit Africa’s 
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economic resources through AFRICOM, since, by providing security support, the USA 
can obtain the confidence of African governments and influence them for its own 
benefit. Others argue that the USA has become aware of Africa’s great economic 
potential and thus first wants to stabilise Africa through AFRICOM, so that it can have 
access to the continent’s vast resources and make a concerted economic onslaught on 
the continent which is tantamount to a second scramble for Africa. 
 
Although most respondents argue that USA interests are served through AFRICOM, 
they acknowledge positive spin-off for Africa from AFRICOM. It can provide greater 
stability on the continent and enable resource deficient African militaries through training 
and joint projects to protect their sovereign territories.  
 
Only one respondent believes that AFRICOM was established solely almost altruistically 
by USA in the interest of Africa. He argues that AFRICOM was established for the 
betterment of Africa to ensure that Africa is stable for all Africans and that a stable 
Africa means a stable world. The USA is not interested in colonising Africa or any other 
continent and contends that the USA is basically the only country which is really 
concerned about the interest of Africa and its people and which has the resources and 
wherewithal to act on these concerns. 
 
One can therefore conclude that the establishment of AFRICOM serves the USA 
broader foreign policy interest as it helps to stabilise the Africa continent as a precursor 
to securing both USA security needs and economic ambitions in Africa. However, there 
are definite benefits for African countries as AFRICOM could contribute to a more stable 
continent. 
 
5.2.2 What was the African response to AFRICOM and are the initial fears 
borne out since the establishment of AFRICOM? 
The respondents indicate that the African leaders’ response to AFRICOM was very 
hostile and most of the countries indicated they would not host the headquarters of 
AFRICOM. All respondents point to the fact that the African leaders felt that they were 
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not adequately consulted by the USA prior the establishment of AFRICOM and thus did 
not initially understand the need, nor the logic, behind the establishment of the military 
Command. The African continent was also deeply suspicious of the USA intentions, as 
three respondents correctly pointed out. African leaders had a fear of being bullied by 
the USA into accepting something they did not ask for, and they saw the actions of the 
American government as another form of colonising the African continent. Their concern 
was also that, though AFRICOM, they would be compelled to make a USA concern, 
which is the war on terror their own concern, and thus fight what was essentially a USA 
battle on their own turf. The African leaders’ fears where centered in their understanding 
that USA would establish the AFRICOM headquarters on the continent, and that 
AFRICOM meant a greater USA military footprint on the continent, which would make 
the continent a target for terror attacks. 
 
Some respondents pointed out that there were a few, mostly poor, countries that were 
in favor of the establishment AFRICOM, in the hope of opportunistically benefiting from 
USA resources and funding. These countries was more interested in AFRICOM 
because of the possible  economic benefits that it would bring to the country as well as 
the military training it would provide for their own militaries. However, given the lack of 
resources and insufficient infrastructure in these countries (e.g. Liberia), these were 
never seriously considered by the USA to host AFRICOM. 
 
Most respondents highlighted the fact that the USA government had an about-turn on 
the establishment of AFRICOM headquarters on the continent after it realised how 
united African leaders were against hosting AFRICOM. This united African resolve 
against USA is a significant victory for the continent. The USA decided to consult more 
widely and to communicate its objectives with regard to AFRICOM more clearly. This 
led to a softening up of African leaders and eventually to a change of stance on 
AFRICOM by most African leaders. One interesting observation in this regard by one 
respondent was this this change of stance coincided with Obama’s election as president 
of the USA, an event which contributed to make AFRICOM more palatable to the 
continent. This is unlikely, as we argued earlier, that most African leaders already began 
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to change their stance on AFRICOM as early as 2008, before OBAMA became the USA 
president. 
 
African leaders, after their initial opposition, later focused on better managing AFRICOM 
and exploiting the benefits attached to the Command. These included military 
assistance to ensure that the continent and their territories are safe. The USA military, 
with its superior intelligence-gathering capabilities, weaponry and other military 
resources, could provide definite benefits for Africa’s under-resourced militaries. The 
respondents pointed out that military-to-military interaction between AFRICOM and the 
African military through different training programmes held many advantages. Some 
respondents also alluded to the benefits of AFRICOM to the AU by providing training to 
AU peace-keeping forces. In addition, AFRICOM’s military personnel are also involved 
in humanitarian work in different African countries, which did not go unnoticed by the 
African governments.   
 
The initial opposition from the continent to AFRICOM is the result of poor 
communication by the USA and its failure to engage African leaders fully. Much of the 
initial opposition was based on a misunderstanding and a deep suspicion of the USA’s 
true intentions with AFRICOM. The fact that the USA later changed its position on 
locating AFRICOM headquarters on the continent helped to win over African skepticism. 
Consequently, after greater consultation and engagement, AFRICOM gained wider 
acceptance and willingness to cooperate from African countries, particularly in the field 
of training and military to military engagements. 
 
5.2.3 Has the USA military footprint in Africa increased since the 
establishment of AFRICOM? 
All respondents agree that the USA military footprint increased since the establishment 
of AFRICOM. However, surprisingly, most respondents view this in a positive light, as 
the USA military brings much-needed skills and expertise and training of African 
militaries and AU troops. The USA military had also been involved in development and 
humanitarian aid efforts. One respondent pointed out that the USA troops are often in 
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African countries on invitation of the host country often assist in humanitarian activities 
like aid and providing valuable assistance in the fight against Ebola and the floods in 
Malawi. The USA also assisted in the fight against piracy off the Somali coast and to 
help Nigeria battle against Boko Haram. Since they are under resourced, African 
militaries often are eager to cooperate with AFRICOM. 
 
The USA, according to one respondent, is the only country which has the means and 
interest to some to Africa’s aid. Others take a more realist view, asserting that the 
USA’s aid and humanitarian efforts are used as a ploy to win over African trust. Still 
others view the increased USA military footprint as a danger and that has a subversive 
element to it, since it also means increased USA intelligence-gathering activities on the 
continent.  
 
It is significant in the responses to this question that the increase of USA military 
footprint on the continent does not seem to bother the respondents, who appear to 
believe that the advantages of an increase in USA military personnel outweighs the 
disadvantages. 
 
5.2.4  Does AFRICOM threaten the overall security of Africa or does it aid 
in securing a more peaceful continent? 
According to the respondents, had the USA persisted with the plan to locate the 
AFRICOM headquarters on the continent, the presence of AFRICOM would have 
definitely presented a target for terror attacks and a threat to the host country. The 
USA’s change of heart regarding AFRICOM’s headquarters put paid to that probability. 
However, it was pointed out by one respondent that USA installations and personnel 
could still be targets of terror attacks with some form of consequences to the host 
countries, as evidenced in Libya and Kenya. 
 
A serious concern was raised by one respondent was USA’s intervention in countries to 
effect regime change, when governments threaten or are not willing to buy into USA’s 
policies and plans. Removing governments and long-established regimes often leaves a 
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vacuum, was amply illustrated by many examples in the so-called “Arab Spring.” This 
leadership vacuum often leads to the country descending into greater chaos and 
anarchy in the immediate aftermath of the regime change.  Should this be the intention 
of the USA with AFRICOM in Africa, according to the respondent, AFRICOM definitely 
presents a serious risk to the continent. 
 
The respondents believe that AFRICOM does not threaten Africa as a whole and can 
well contribute to enhancing security and stability on the continent. However, should 
AFRICOM, through its intervention, ignite greater conflict, it would lead to greater 
destabilisation on the continent. These are evident in areas where the USA used its 
presence to advance regime change like in Syria and Egypt. In this sense, AFRICOM’s 
presence could definitely serve to destabilise the continent. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter data from the previous chapter was analysed and conclusions were 
drawn. The chapter helped to add to the knowledge gained in the chapter on the 
literature review and assisted in presenting a nuanced understanding of AFRICOM by 
discussing the views and opinions of experts in the field, who are from different sides of 
the fence. 
 
  
Fixter C Page 71 
 
CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to explore and understand the logic behind the 
establishment of AFRICOM and its implications for Africa. This chapter will present the 
conclusions, starting with a brief overview of the background and literature review of the 
study. This chapter will also provide the findings based on the information gathered from 
the interviews conducted. In addition, the chapter will consider the implications of the 
study for future research on the broad field of USA foreign policy towards Africa.  
 
6.2 CONCLUSION 
6.2.1 BACKGROUND 
This section provided a background on the establishment of AFRICOM as well as the 
reasons given by the USA for the establishment of the Command. The section also 
discussed the sudden interest shown by the USA in Africa,  whereas a decade ago the 
USA has openly declared Africa as not part of the American national strategic interest. 
Barkely (2009) stated that the USA relations with Africa at the turn of the 21st Century 
seemed to mirror those of the 20th Century which he described as “marginalized at 
best”. This had however changed as Frances (2010) states that the establishment of 
AFRICOM represents a shift in the policy approach of the USA towards Africa. The shift 
in policy, it was shown, was based on the renewed realisation by the USA, and indeed 
other global powers like China, Russia and India of the vast resources, both in energy 
and minerals Africa offers. We also showed how Africa, with a growth rate of over five 
percent, has become in just more than a decade, a continent of hope and great 
potential, and with a fast growing middle class, offers a growing market and great return 
on investment. However the continent, with its vast open spaces and porous borders, 
was also seen by the USA as a security threat despite its great potential. Thus the USA 
change in Africa policy was prompted by the opportunities Africa offered as a vehicle to 
drive USA economic recovery. Thus by stabilising the continent through the military 
Command AFRICOM, the USA was preparing the continent to safeguard its economic 
interest.  
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6.2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section provided a theoretical perspective on AFRICOM. It also discussed the 
change in the USA foreign policy on Africa and it showed the significant growth of the 
African economy over the last decade, with 11 of the world’s fastest growing economies 
in Africa.  
 
This literature showed the USA did not properly consult with the African leaders prior to 
the announcement of AFRICOM, which led to much unease and discontent on the 
continent. The lack of consultation led to the suspicion by many, that AFRICOM 
heralded the militarisation of the USA African foreign policy. As stated by Brown (2013), 
so vociferous was the reaction to AFRICOM’s announcement in 2007, that the AU 
issued a non-binding resolution in which it had asked its member-states not to host 
AFRICOM on the continent. Ezekiel Pajino of the Centre for Empowerment in Liberia 
who called AFRICOM “a deadly plan of US military expansion on African soil”. And this 
led to a wave of protest from African academics, scholars and civil society opinion 
makers.  
 
The chapter showed further that much of these concerns were premised on unfounded 
assumptions by African leaders due to insufficient consultations by the USA. The USA 
back tracked on its plans to establish a base for AFRICOM on the continent, and this 
decision went a long way in securing the buy-in of African leaders, who feared reprisal 
terrorist on the continent due to hosting AFRICOM and thus turning the continent into a 
war zone. In addition, the literature showed that, through communication and 
consultation the USA subsequently managed to convince African leaders that although 
AFRICOM primarily served USA interests, it would also be beneficial for the continent, 
especially on the military and development front. This was also further established in 
Chapter 4 where it was argued that although AFRICOM did in fact increase the USA 
military footprint on the continent, there where definite benefits to the continent. Thus 
Salih (2010), states that some African civilians, military, security experts and 
researchers have come to realise the utility of AFRICOM’s technical and military 
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capabilities in confronting the global continental and regional security threats, and that 
no single country, or even region can confront their security threats alone.  
 
As stated above, this chapter confirmed that the establishment of AFRICOM did expand 
the USA military footprint on the continent. However, this was not purely negative but 
also yielded many positive result for Africa as Mesfin (2009) clearly shows. He further 
argues that, according to the USA officials, the full-time focus of AFRICOM will be to 
provide military aid and training to African militaries in order for them to be able to 
secure their own borders and to regulate their internal environment on a sustained 
basis.  Similarly we also pointed out that according to Davis (2009),   the expectation of 
the USA is that of a world that has only democratic states, states that effectively govern 
their territories and which will provide a secure congenial environment for the USA 
interest.  AFRICOM thus is the USA mechanism which will provide and advance that 
agenda in Africa. 
  
6.3  FINDINGS FOR USA 
 
The study shows that with respect to the USA: 
6.3.1 The birth of AFRICOM should be seen in the light of the USA broader African 
foreign policy position. AFRICOM presents a major shift in the USA foreign policy 
towards Africa, from little interest in the early nineties to serious strategic interest in the 
mid-nineties to the present. 
 
6.3.2  This shift in USA’s Africa policy was initially driven by a security interest and the 
USA war on terror because Africa was considered a safe haven for terrorists to ferment 
insurrection against the USA. Thus in the USA National Security Strategy in the late 
nineties, African was mentioned only with regard to the USA’s war on terror. 
 
6.3.3 However, more recently, a secondary reason for the change in USA’s Africa policy 
emerged. This reason is economic, as the USA, like other global powers came to 
realise Africa’s great resource potential and the opportunities it presented for economic 
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co-operation and trade which led to the establishment of the Africa Growth and 
Opportunities Act, AGOA, under George Bush, and it was set for renewal in September 
2015. Additionally, rich crude oil deposits in Nigeria, Angola Sudan, with more recent 
discoveries in Uganda and Ghana, provide the USA with an alternative energy resource 
to the volatile Middle East.  
 
6.3.4  Thus, by establishing a Command for Africa, AFRICOM, by which the USA seeks 
to bring greater stability and security to the continent, the USA wishes to secure, not 
only its immediate- and long-term security needs, but also their immediate- and long-
term economic needs as it emerges from the global recession in 2008. Africa, as the 
fastest growing continent, with a huge youth population (labour), and a burgeoning 
middle class, huge resource reserves, has become indispensible to the USA, which is 
doing much to tap into the continent’s vast potential. Thus, the study confirmed an 
earlier assertion that AFRICOM needs to stabilise the continent for USA’s economic 
onslaught. However, as the experience with the AGOA programme has shown, both the 
USA and Africa can benefit greatly from greater economic cooperation.  
 
6.3.5 The reasons presented in 6.2.4 led to the first ever USA-Africa leadership summit 
in August 2014 in Washington, USA, which is an indication that the USA is beginning to 
take Africa seriously, not for altruistic reasons as is always falsely believed, but for its 
own interest and development.   
 
6.3.2  FINDINGS FOR AFRICA 
However from the perspective of Africa, the study shows that: 
6.3.2.1 The initial fears of USA interference and dominance on the continent is thus far 
unfounded, as unified African opposition to AFRICOM forced the USA to change track 
regarding some of their plans regarding AFRICOM. Some of the initial charges that 
AFRICOM is another form of colonialisation of Africa by the USA is not borne out by this 
research. 
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6.3.2.2 The AFRICOM experience shows that Africa must deal with superpowers such 
as the USA, not as individual countries, but as a collective, giving them a greater 
chance to be heard and make an impact. This is because the USA is a global 
superpower and, as such, will always have deeply unequal relations with individual 
African countries. Thus, only as a collective Africa can ensure greater parity in relations 
with the USA. 
 
6.3.2.3 While the charge that AFRICOM presents the militarisation of USA’s African 
foreign policy cannot be borne out by the findings of this study, the USA military 
footprint on the continent has increased since the establishment of AFRICOM. A 
somewhat unexpected finding is that there are that the many benefits attached to the 
increased USA presence far outweighs the disadvantages, and that many African states 
welcome the military assistance offered by the USA. Assistance in training and dealing 
with security challenges, humanitarian aid and disaster relief are often done on the 
invitation of individual African countries. 
 
6.3.2.4 There are, however, the research shows, very real challenges and dangers in 
having the USA in one’s own backyard. USA security concerns are not necessarily the 
security concerns of Africa, and the USA could make Africa the theatre for fighting its 
(the USA’s) fight, as already happened.  
 
6.3.2.5 In addition, should the USA pursue its regime change agenda on the continent 
as it is doing elsewhere, it could contribute to greatly destabilise the continent. This 
however, the study shows, will militate against its security and economic interests. 
 
6.3.2.6 While individual countries cannot counter the USA, they can be persuaded by 
the collective. However, no country can persuade the USA to discontinue AFRICOM by 
refusing to cooperate. The countries that have come to grips with the USA’s Africa 
Command and learned to manage their USA relations in this regard, have also 
benefited the most. 
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6.4  CONCLUSION 
The wave of protests that greeted the announcement of the USA Africa Command in 
2007 should be laid at the feet of the USA government which failed to consult African 
leaders and trying to conceal its true intentions for establishing AFRICOM. This strategy 
by the USA failed, as it led to great suspicion and mistrust on the African continent, 
which rightly questioned why establishing a military command was necessary if 
development was truly AFRICOM’s objective. In addition, why pretend to create 
something in Africa’s interest when the USA failed to consult Africa about it, and the fact 
that Africa never approached the USA to assist with its many security concerns, which 
the African Union was in the process of addressing? 
 
Greater openness and respect by the USA for African leaders would have meant a far 
different initial outcome, and the establishment of AFRICOM ultimately proved   seminal 
in the growth of USA-Africa relations. The USA has learned from this incident, and 
taking the African leadership into its confidence eventually led to greater understanding 
and cooperation from Africa. The USA will not change its mind about AFRICOM in the 
immediate future. It may also re-engage Africa on the issue of hosting AFRICOM. The 
study has shown that most of the initial fears were not realised, and by open 
engagement and consultation, both the USA and Africa could continue to benefit from 
AFRICOM. The study has also shown that AFRICOM is beneficial for the continent as it 
has trained and assisted certain African militaries and helped with development on the 
continent, particularly disaster relief as was seen in the Malawi floods and the recent 
fight against Ebola. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
To whom it may concern 
 
Re: Research Report Questions 
 
This letter serves to confirm that Fixter C, student number 702082, is currently 
registered for the Masters of Management in the field of Security (MM S) at the Wits 
School of Governance. As part of the requirements to complete the Master’s she has to 
submit a research report.  
 
The working title of her research is “The US Africa Command and USA foreign policy on 
Africa”.  
 
The research may include one or more of the methods of interviews, questionnaire 
studies, focus group discussions and documentary analysis. The research will culminate 
in a research report.  
 
We request your assistance with regard to data collection for research purposes 
towards her Masters of Management. This information will be used only for research 
purposes. All the information will be kept anonymous and confidential. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
The following people were directly interviewed on the relevant issues for the research 
report: 
 
 
Respondent  A-G 
Interview Date Between January and February 2015 
Time Between 08h00 and 17h00 
Locality Johannesburg and Pretoria 
 
 
PART 1:          Biographical Information 
 
 
1.1. Age Category 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 + 
  
   
1.2. Personal Status 
Gender                 Marital Status 
M F Primary Secondary Tertiary Single Married Widowed 
 
 
1.3. Employment/Occupation 
Employed  Non-governmental Organisation 
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APPENDIX C 
 
The following are the research questions: 
 
Part 1 
 
1. Whose interests are served by the establishment of AFRICOM? 
 
Part 2 
 
2. What was the African response to AFRICOM and are the initial fears 
borne out since the establishment of AFRICOM? 
 
 
Part 3 
 
3. Does AFRICOM threaten the overall security of Africa or does it aid in 
securing a more peaceful continent? 
 
 
Part 4: 
 
4. Has the USA military footprint increased since the establishment of 
AFRICOM? 
 
